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INTRODUCTION

Opinions about tax havens cover a wide spectrum. Some suggest tax havens present an unacceptable face of capitalism and
inflict considerable damage on the economies of non-haven coun-
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tries.' Others argue that havens offer relief from oppressive taxes
and other regulations which inhibit the free and efficient flow of
capital; 2 and still others hold the view that tax haven status may
act as a catalyst for economic development.' Obviously, the opinions vary according to whether a person is a tax collector in a
non-haven country, a taxpayer engaged in international business
activities, or a government policymaker in a haven country.
The objective of this Article is to examine the facts from which
these opinions developed in order to gain a better understanding
of tax havens and the pressures leading to their creation and perpetuation. Special attention will be paid to identifying the interests of the major parties affected by tax haven activities: industri-

alized countries,

non-haven

developing

countries,

foreign

investors, and the tax havens themselves.
The remainder of this Article is divided into five parts. Part H
identifies the principal attributes of tax havens. Part I deals
with transactions using tax havens, and Part IV discusses the various legitimate interests affected by the existence of tax havens.
Part V then provides a summary of the responses of non-haven
countries to the abuse of tax havens and Part VI offers some concluding comments and observations.
H. TAX HAVENS DESCRIBED
A. PrincipalAttributes of Tax Havens
At the outset, it may be useful to recognize that many countries
not widely recognized as such can be characterized as tax havens
for particular types of income or activities. The United States, for
example, a frequent critic of the existence of tax havens, can be
characterized as a tax haven with respect to income from investments in United States real estate and interest income paid to
1.

See generally Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House

Ways and Means Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Oversight Subcomm. Hearings 1]; Symonds, Tax Havens Under Fire Again, AccouNTANT, May 19, 1977 at 573; Roscow & Berton, Tax Havens under Siege, 143

FiN. WORLD 9 (1975).
2. See van Hoorn, Jr., Problems, Possibilitiesand Limitations with Respect
to Measures Against International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 8
INT'L & Comp. L. 763 (1978).

GA.

J.

OF

3. See de Jantscher, Tax Havens Explained, 1976 FIN. & D.v. 31; Policy
and Economic View of a CaribbeanCountry v. U.S. Tax Policy (1980)(Netherlands Antilles Position Paper) [hereinafter cited as Position Paper].
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foreign persons 4 that is earned on deposits with United States
banks or United States branches of foreign banks. Similarly,
South Africa and France, which rely heavily on the territoriality
principle of taxation, have tax regimes somewhat similar to those
of acknowledged tax havens, such as Panama and Liberia.
Hence, tax haven status is a matter of degree more than anything else. Nevertheless, some countries are widely acknowledged
to be tax havens. 5 These traditional tax havens are a varied collection of colonies, principalities, and independent countriese geographically dispersed throughout the world and ranging from
among the richest countries to the poorest. Notwithstanding their
geographic, political, and economic diversity, tax havens share
several common features. First, tax havens have low or nil taxes,
which are structured to offer foreign persons an opportunity to
avoid or evade7 the taxes of other countries. The tax regimes of
haven countries generally fall into one of three categories: pure

tax havens, liberal tax havens, and tax treaty havens. Each category is discussed below. A second feature of tax havens generally
is an absence or minimum of exchange control restrictions.
Bahrain, the Cayman Islands, and Vanuatu, for example, impose
no currency restrictions on foreign nationals. 8 The Bahamas, on
the other hand, does have exchange controls, but they are imposed only on persons residing or doing business in the Bahamas.
A third feature usually found in tax havens is laws insuring the
confidentiality of financial and commercial information. Although
such laws are not found in all tax havens, many haven countries
have bank secrecy and similar internal laws making it a crime to
4. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(1)(A), 871(a),(d)(1981).
5. The International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation lists the following as
the most important tax havens: Andorra, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Eire,
Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Singapore, Switzerland, Turks and Caicos,
and Vanuatu. 31 BULL. FOR INT'L FIscAL Doc'T. 5 (1977); see also Pepper, From
Tax Haven to Fiscal Paradise,31 BULL. FOR INT'L FIscAL Doc'T. 31, 37 (1977).

6. Although not all tax havens are independent countries, for convenience in
this paper, the havens sometimes are referred to collectively as "countries."
7. Tax evasion is generally defined as an illegal attempt to reduce taxes. Tax
avoidance, on the other hand, refers to attempts to minimize taxes which techni-

cally are legal, but not within the spirit of the law. See infra text accompanying
notes 104-15.
8.

See 80-10 TAx

MGMT. INT'L

J. 37 (1980).
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disclose such information to any person. Though Swiss bank secrecy is renowned,9 legislation in other tax havens such as Liechtenstein, 10 the Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands is even more
stringent. The bank secrecy laws of the Bahamas and the Cayman
Islands, for example, make it virtually impossible for foreign government officials to obtain information helpful in tax fraud investigation. The Cayman Islands are considering going even further
by creating an enclave where non-residents can transact business
without going through passport control and formally entering the
territory.1 2 Many tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands,
Netherlands Antilles, and Vanuatu, permit corporations to issue
shares in bearer form so the identities of the true owners of corporations are easily hidden. s In addition, the tax havens usually
have a well-defined policy against entering into international
agreements (such as tax treaties and mutual assistance treaties)
9. Swiss bank secrecy is superseded in a number of important instances
under domestic Swiss law. The most important of these is the exemption for
criminal investigations. In that situation a banker has no privilege to refuse to
testify on grounds that the information is confidential. Oversight Subcomm.
Hearings I, supra note 1, at 288-89. The mutual assistance treaty between the
United States and Switzerland, which entered into force in January 1977, provides that the Swiss Government may make fiscal information available to the
United States if such information relates to an investigation of organized crime.
Id. at 290.

10. Since 1960 Liechtenstein has had its own banking law. Its provisions are
even more strict than those of its Swiss model, providing stiff penalties for anyone who trangresses the rules on bank secrecy. Financial Times, July 29, 1980, at
12, col. 5.
11. The Bahamian bank secrecy law is found in section 10 of the Banks and
Trust Companies Regulation Act of 1965. The Cayman Islands enacted identical
legislation in the Banks and Trust Companies Regulations Law, 1966. In the
wake of In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976), a case establishing that foreign
persons subpoenaed in the United States to give testimony before federal grand
juries must testify even though providing the testimony is violative of their residence's laws, the Cayman Islands, on September 8, 1976, enacted the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law. The law, designed to cure perceived
shortcomings in the bank secrecy law, imposes criminal sanctions not only upon
those who divulge or attempt to divulge confidential information, but also upon
those willfully obtaining or attempting to obtain such information. Oversight
Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 15-16.
12. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 266.
13. See, e.g., PRICE, WATERHOUSE & Co., 1979 DOING BusiNEss IN THE
NETHERLANxs ANTILxEs 13; PRIcE, WATERHOUSE & Co., 1977 DOING BusiNEss IN
THE NEW HEBRMES

26.
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which might override domestic confidentiality laws. A fourth attribute common to the more successful tax havens is a record of
political stability and a governmental attitude strongly favorable
toward foreign investors.1 4 Bermuda, Switzerland, Liechtenstein,
Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands
owe their success as tax havens in part to their political stability
and an environment favorable to foreign investors., 5 Continued
unsettled conditions in other parts of the world have focused attention on the importance of political stability in particular.16 Finally, most tax havens offer good travel, telex and telephone links
to industrialized countries, good business facilities, and well
trained staff to expedite haven transactions. 7 Hong Kong, for example, offers excellent air transportation services, and its communications systems are highly efficient and reliable. The Netherlands Antilles has expended considerable effort recruiting
sophisticated personnel to manage its tax haven activities and has
spent over $100 million acquiring improved telephone and telecommunications facilities.1
B. Fiscal Structure of Tax Havens
To gain a better understanding of tax havens, it may be useful
to divide them into the following categories according to the
structure of their fiscal systems: pure tax havens, liberal tax

havens, and tax treaty havens.
1. Pure Tax Havens
Pure tax havens impose no direct taxes on income, profits, or
capital gains and do not have death duties, succession taxes, or
14. In 1979 the Government of Barbados passed legislation permitting offshore banking activities. The government thinks Barbados will be attractive as
an offshore financial center because it has the "major requirements for the business-a well-developed infrastructure, political stability, a flexible labour force
and first-class communications." Financial Times, Dec. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 7.
15. Long term colonies with no apparent aspirations for independence are
often considered ideal tax havens. See, Pepper, supra note 5, at 33.
16. Financial Times, July 22, 1980, at 30, col. 1.
17. One of the reasons often given for Vanuatu's inability to develop a more
substantial tax haven sector has been the inadequacy of its travel and communications systems. See D. DIAMoND & W. DIAMOND, TAX HAVENS OF THE WORLD
182 (1978); R. KINSMAN, Gumn TO TAX HAVENS (1978); M. LANGER, INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING (2d ed. 1979).
18. Position Paper, supra note 3, at 1, 7-8.

TAX HAVENS

19821

gift and inheritance taxes. They may, however, have employment
taxes, customs duties, and real property taxes. In addition, as in
other haven countries, the pure tax havens impose license and registration fees on various haven related activities. Thus, in most
cases, registration fees are imposed on the formation of holding
companies, finance subsidiaries, trusts, and other haven entities;
annual license fees are imposed as a condition for continuing to
carry on haven transactions and fees are charged for work permits
for expatriates working in the tax haven sector.1 '
Generally, pure tax havens are attractive places to accumulate
income free of taxes and exchange controls. To take advantage of
pure tax havens, however, the transactions giving rise to haven
income must be structured to avoid taxes in other jurisdictions.
Hence, it would not be especially advantageous for a United
States resident to form a Bahamian corporation to make loans at
commercial rates to the United States resident and his relatives.
In such a case, the interest paid on the loan would not be taxed in
the Bahamas, but the United States would treat the interest as
having a United States source and impose a thirty percent gross
withholding tax on it.20 The Bahamian corporation also might be
characterized as a foreign personal holding company under
United States tax law and therefore be subject to additional
taxes.2"

On the other hand, if a United Kingdom corporation is selling
goods to an Australian affiliate, it may be advantageous to route
the sale through a conduit corporation formed in Vanuatu, Nauru, or another pure tax haven. By having the United Kingdom
corporation sell to a related Vanuatu corporation at a low price
(just above the seller's cost, for example) and the Vanuatu corporation sell to the Australian affiliate at a high price (e.g., just below the price at which the Australian affiliate resells the goods),
the bulk of the profits from the sales will arise in Vanuatu and be
attributable to the Vanuatu corporation, thereby escaping taxa-

tion in either the United Kingdom or Australia.2 1 Because the
19.

See de Jantscher, supra note 3; Pepper, supra note 5, at 37.

20. I.R.C. §§ 881, 1442 (1981).
21.

Id. § 551.

22. The utility of this classic tax haven transaction, and others like it, was
eroded greatly by widespread adoption of anti-tax haven legislation and transfer
pricing regulations aimed at preventing the tax-free accumulation of income in
situations such as that described in the text. See infra text accompanying notes
f74-213.
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chances of escaping taxation are greatly increased if it is not apparent that the Vanuatu corporation is -related to the United
Kingdom and Australian enterprises, Vanuatu corporate confidentiality laws may be useful to prevent disclosure of the true
ownership of the Vanuatu corporation.
Pure tax havens also are used widely as offshore financial centers where funds are borrowed from nonresidents and lent to
other nonresidents through the intermediation of banks and other
financial institutions. The pure tax havens are attractive sites for
these activities because the banking operations can be conducted
free of exchange controls and reserve requirements. 3 The secrecy
laws and absence of taxes are also attractive to bank customers,
although the banks themselves may not benefit greatly from either of these.2 '
The Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos, Nauru, and Vanuatu commonly are considered pure tax
havens.25 Other havens come close to being pure tax havens, but
impose relatively minor direct taxes on income. The British Virgin Islands, for example, imposes an income tax on both individu26
als and companies, but the maximum tax rate is fifteen percent.
2.

Liberal Tax Havens

Liberal tax havens generally have direct taxes of some sort, but
accord traditional haven activities favored tax treatment. Although such tax preferences are fairly common in non-haven
countries,27 the combination of tax preferences, a governmental
attitude favoring haven activities, and the size of haven activities
relative to the domestic economy distinguish liberal tax havens
from other countries offering similar tax preferences. 2 8
23. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 324-25.
24. Id.

25. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 14.
26. Pepper, supra note 5, at 33.
27. France and Australia, for example, tax on the territoriality principle, as
do Hong Kong, Panama, and Costa Rica. PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO., 1978 DOING
BUSINESS IN AUSTRALIA 68; PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO., 1979 DOING BUSINESS IN
FRANCE 83; 1980 PRICE, WATERHOUSE & Co., DOING BusINEss INPANAMA 33. The

United States exempts interest received by foreign persons on deposits held in
United States banks or in United States branches of foreign banks. I.R.C. §§
861(a)(1)(A), 861(c)(1981).
28. Some liberal tax havens, notably Hong Kong and Singapore, resist being
labelled as tax havens and prefer to be characterized as financial centers. They

1982]
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The tax preferences for haven activities in some liberal tax
havens arise as a result of their basic tax structure. Hong Kong,
Panama, and Costa Rica, for example, have income taxes, but because they rely on the territoriality principle to determine the
scope of their tax jurisdiction, foreign source income generally is
not taxed. 29 In other liberal tax havens, the tax preferences exist
because of conscious governmental policy encouraging particular
activities. For instance, the Republic of Ireland allows an individual who is an established novelist, playwright, composer, artist,
sculptor or similar creative worker to establish a residence in Ireland and receive artistic earnings free of tax.30 Since 1965, Barbados has had legislation permitting registration of "international
business companies" that are taxed at a rate of two percent on
their global profits (the normal rate being considerably
higher-generally forty-five percent) and are allowed to remit
dividends to nonresidents free of tax.1 In 1979, Barbados passed

additional legislation allowing offshore banking activities subject
to only a modest tax on profits.2 The Philippines in 1976, and
Puerto Rico in 1980, passed similar legislation to stimulate offshore banking activities in their territories. 33

Some liberal tax havens combine tax systems based on the territoriality principle with special nontax legislation designed to facilitate particular haven activities-notably registration of ships
certainly are correct in claiming that they are not pure tax havens. They impose
direct taxes even on income from some haven activities-notably offshore banking income. On the other hand, in Singapore the rate imposed on offshore banking income is considerably lower than the rates generally applied to corporate
income. As of March 1980 the rate of tax on offshore banking income in Singapore was 10 percent while the normal corporate tax rate was 40 percent. Soin,
Singapore: Taxation and the Singapore Asia Dollar Market, 80-3 TAX MGMT.
INT'L J. 7, 8 (1980). In Hong Kong, the tax rate on offshore banking income is
the same as the normal corporate tax rate, but that rate is only 17 percent. Id. at
9; PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO., 1979 DOING BUSINESS IN HONG KONG 39.
29. Oversight Subcomm. HearingsI, supra note 1, at 14; PRICE, WATERHOUSE
& Co., 1980 DOING BusiNEss IN PANAmA 31-32; Financial Times, July 7, 1980, at
46.
30. A. ANDERSON, TAX AND TRADE GUIDE - REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 72 (2d ed.
1979). Other places, such as Malta, the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, and Sri
Lanka, encourage wealthy individuals to become "tax exiles" from high tax industrialized areas. Financial Times, July 8, 1980, at 15.
31. Pepper, supra note 5, at 76.
32. Financial Times, Dec. 3, 1980, at 12.
33. Soin, supra note 28, at 9; Woods, Puerto Rico: The New International
Banking Center Law, 80-11 TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 15 (1980).

458

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15.:449

under "flags of convenience." Liberia, Panama, Singapore, 4 and
Malta are examples of countries offering income tax exemption
and special registration requirements for shipping activities. 5
Liberal tax havens are often attractive places to locate activities producing foreign source income. Panama thus has become
an important regional financial center for offshore banking operations. 6 Hong Kong and Singapore, although they do impose some
taxes on offshore banking income, have become major international centers for offshore banking operations, in part because
their tax rates, seventeen percent and ten percent respectively,
are far below the rates prevailing in other countries. Of course,
the absence of significant exchange control restrictions and banking regulations, and the presence of excellent communications facilities and highly skilled professional services, are probably more
important factors than the tax preferences available.3 7 Bank customers, in some cases, also may be attracted by relatively rigorous
bank secrecy laws.38
34. Singapore generally taxes under a modified territoriality principle under

which income is not subject to tax unless it arises in Singapore or is remitted to
a person resident in Singapore. PRICE, WATERHOUSE & Co., 1980 DOING BUSINESS

43, 49. Income can be accumulated abroad without paying the Singapore income tax. Id. In addition, income from the operation of Singapore registered ships is exempt from tax. Id.
35. See, e.g., PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO., 1980 DOING BusiNEss IN PANAMA 48.
36. Under the territoriality principle used in Panama, interest income from
loans made to foreign persons is foreign source income and not taxed in Panama. Id. Furthermore, as a result of special legislation, interest paid by offshore
banks located in Panama is exempt from Panamanian tax. Id.
37. The Philippines had difficulty getting its offshore banking activities to
flourish even though the Philippine tax rate on offshore banking income is only
five percent, which is lower than either the rate in Hong Kong or Singapore.
Soin, supra note 28, at 9. Probable reasons for the lack of success are the less
favorable monetary controls and regulatory climate in the Philippines as compared to Hong Kong and Singapore. Id.
On the other hand, the possible impact of taxes is not completely disregarded
in Hong Kong and Singapore, as is apparent from the constant attention each
pays to the taxes imposed by the other. Hong Kong at present imposes a 15
percent withholding tax on interest paid to foreign depositors. Although recent
transactions (notably U.S. dollar denominated certificates of deposit) have been
structured so as to avoid this withholding tax, a recent government report has
implied that repeal of the withholding tax might be appropriate given that Singapore no longer has such a withholding tax. Financial Times, July 7, 1980, at 7.
38. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 324. Where the offshore banking operations in either a pure tax haven or a liberal tax haven are
carried on by a branch of a bank from an industrialized country, the tax preferIN SINGAPORE
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Liberal tax havens are also useful for establishing holding companies and trusts provided the income earned by the holding
companies and trusts is foreign source and not subject to tax in
other countries. 9 Of course, some liberal tax havens are well
suited as bases from which to carry on shipping operations or engage in artistic endeavors.
3. Tax Treaty Havens
Tax treaty havens are parties to tax treaties under which they
offer access to attractive markets to individuals and corporations,
who generally are not residents of the havens, on favorable tax
terms. In the typical transaction making use of a tax treaty haven, capital originates in a third country, passes through a company, trust, or similar entity formed in the tax treaty haven and
is then lodged in another country. Depending on the nature of the
transaction, either the country where the capital originates, or the
country where it is lodged, or both, will be parties to the treaties
by which the tax treaty haven offers tax preferences.
Tax treaties are used widely to obtain tax advantages not otherwise available in the domestic legislation of the contracting
states. In fact, the tax preferences accorded international business
and investment transactions are one of the principle reasons
countries conclude the treaties. 40 The benefits offered by tax
treaty havens are distinguishable from the more generalized benefits available under tax treaties because the former arise from
more than just a favorable tax treaty. Countries with favorable
tax treaties become havens because they offer a combination of (i)
a favorable tax treaty which generally provides relief from source
withholding taxes on interest, dividends, and royalties paid to residents of the tax treaty haven (including resident corporations
owned by third country residents), (ii) a low or nil tax burden in
ences available in the haven country generally do not inure to the banks, but to
the countries in which the banks are resident through a reduction in the amount
of the foreign tax credit the resident countries are obliged to give the banks. Id.
at 325.
39. Financial Times, Dec. 3, 1980, at 12; Pepper, supra note 5, at 76.
40. See generally Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House
Ways and Means Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 269 (statement of H. Rosenbloom, Dept. of the Treasury, April 29, 1980)[hereinafter cited as Oversight
Subcomm. HearingsII]; Surrey, InternationalTax Conventions: How They Operate and What They Accomplish, 23 J. TAX'N 364 (1965).
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the tax treaty haven on income covered by the tax treaty, and (iii)
freedom from withholding taxes on remittances of interest, dividends, and royalties from the tax treaty haven.41
A number of countries offer tax benefits because of the interaction between tax treaties and domestic tax laws. The most prominent tax treaty havens are countries or territories covered by tax
treaties offering tax-favored access either into or out of the
United States. The Netherlands Antilles is probably the single
most important tax treaty haven,'2 but the British Virgin Islands,
Barbados, Honduras, and Switzerland also have tax treaties and
domestic legislation combining to produce tax preferences not
otherwise available.'3
Tax treaty havens commonly are used as conduits in international financing and investment transactions. For example, a
United States company wishing to finance domestic operations on
the Eurobond market often forms a Netherlands Antilles finance
subsidiary to borrow funds abroad and then lend them to the
United States parent. If the parent borrowed the funds directly
on the Eurobond market, the interest paid to the foreign creditors
might be subject to the United States thirty percent gross withholding tax." By arranging the financing through the Nether-

lands Antilles, however, the interest paid by the parent to the
subsidiary is exempt from the United States withholding tax
under Article VIII of the United States/Netherlands Antilles tax
treaty.45 The interest paid by the Antilles subsidiary to foreign
creditors is exempt from Netherlands Antilles tax under domestic
law and exempt from the United States withholding tax under
either United States domestic law or Article XII of the United
41. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings II, supra note 40, at 5 (response of H.
Rosenbloom, ITC, Dept. of the Treasury, to questions of Representative Gibbons, July 30, 1980).
42. Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Description of H.R. 7553 Relating to Exemptions from U.S. Tax for InterestPaid to ForeignPersons, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1980)[hereinafter cited as Joint Tax'n Comm.].
43. Id. at 6; Langer, The Need for Reform in the Tax Treaty Area, in INCOME TAX TREATIES

717, 732-35 (J. Bischel ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as IN-

COME TAX TREATIES].

44. I.R.C. §§ 871, 881, 1441-1442 (1981); Joint Tax'n Comm., supra note 42,
at 9-10.
45. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 293; PRICE,
WATERHOUSE & CO., 1979 DOING BUSINESS IN THE NETHERLANDS ANTLLES 32;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S.
REAL ESTATE 42 (1979); Position Paper, supra note 3.
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States/Netherlands Antilles tax treaty. Further, the net income
earned by the Antilles subsidiary (after deduction for the interest
paid to the foreign creditors) generally is taxed in the Netherlands Antilles at a rate of twenty-four percent.47
IIl. TAx HAVEN

TRANSACTIONS

A. In General

Generally speaking, tax haven transactions are international
trade and investment activities formally structured to legally
avoid or illegally evade tax or other laws in non-haven countries.
A central characteristic of tax haven transactions is the absence
of substantial economic activity in the tax havens involved in the
transactions. Tax havens usually serve only as conduits, booking
centers, or places of formal ownership, with the real economic activity, including, on many occasions, even the record keeping relating to the tax haven's role in the transaction, taking place in
other jurisdictions. 8

Since World War II, when many countries raised taxes to unprecedented levels, there has been a brisk business in establishing
tax havens and making use of their facilities. Aggregate fiscal
losses to non-haven countries (or savings to taxpayers-depending on one's point of view) resulting from tax haven
activities cannot be estimated accurately, but they undoubtedly
amount to billions of dollars annually, with only a small fraction
of the losses accruing to tax havens. The fragmented evidence
available clearly suggests that tax haven transactions are substantial in amount and growing at a relatively rapid pace. The growth
of offshore banking activities in the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Panama, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Bahrain, as

well as legislative activity in other jurisdictions (the Philippines,
Barbados, Puerto Rico, and the United States, for example)
aimed at facilitating the establishment of an offshore banking sector is unmistakable evidence of the importance of offshore banking. The substantial growth of revenues derived from internation46. Position Paper, supra note 3, at 4-5.

47. Id.
48. Of course, there is no clear line between tax haven transactions and other
international business and investment transactions where the form of the transaction reflects its substance, nor is there a clear distinction between legal avoid-

ance and illegal evasion of the laws of other countries.
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al finance subsidiaries of United States corporations by the
Netherlands Antilles and the figures on the growth of borrowing
on the Eurobond market through these subsidiaries establish the
significance of such activities. Transfer pricing, whether it involves avoidance or evasion of the laws of non-haven countries, is
generally thought to be a relatively common practice with substantial amounts being shifted from non-haven countries to tax
havens. As for the use of tax havens to evade and avoid nontax
laws of non-haven countries, recent studies by the United States
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission demonstrate that such practices are not uncommon. 49 As a consequence,
even though an estimate on the aggregate volume of tax haven
transactions cannot be made, these transactions are a significant
factor in international business and investment.
B. Description of Tax Haven Transactions
1. Major Tax Haven Transactions Involving Avoidance of
Taxes and Other Laws
a. Offshore banking
Offshore financial centers are locations where funds are borrowed from nonresidents and lent to other nonresidents through
the mediation of banks and other financial institutions.5 0 The ma49. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 15; Pepper, supra note
5, at 31.

50. Offshore banking activities have grown considerably in recent years, particularly in areas outside the major financial market of London. There are 305
licensed bank and trust companies, 21 of which were registered in the past year
in the Bahamas. Although accurate figures are not available, it appears that the
Bahamian share of the Eurocurrency market is close to 10 percent, second only
to London. Since 1975, the assets of United States bank branches in the Bahamas have more than doubled from $38.3 billion to $89.7 billion at the end of
February, 1980. Financial Times, July 22, 1980, at 30. In Singapore, there has
been a spectacular increase in offshore banking from a small base 12 years ago.
In the nine months to September 30, 1980, the Asia dollar market has continued
to expand at a rate of about 40 percent per annum and now has assets of about
$25 billion. Financial Times, Nov. 18, 1980, at IV. The growth of offshore banking activities in Bahrain has been characterized as one of the most successful
aspects of the modern development of the Middle East economy. Id. at XI. Off
shore banking activities were launched in 1975 and total assets now exceed $31
billion. In 1964 the Cayman Islands had only one or two banks and virtually no
offshore business. By January 31, 1977, the Cayman Islands had 218 licensed
banks and trust companies. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at
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jor offshore financial centers are London, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Panama, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Bahrain. Some
of these centers are fully operational; they conduct actual dealings with customers to obtain funds and negotiate credits. Other
centers are merely booking centers where deposits and loans are
formally lodged, but no transactions are physically performed.
15. At the end of 1978, United States bank branches in the Cayman Islands had
assets of $18.3 billion. Id. at 327.
Although offshore banking today is a natural consequence of the increasing
internationalization of business, United States regulations were a significant factor in the growth of offshore banking activities in the 1960s and early 1970s. Id.
at 324. Beginning in 1963, at a time of fixed exchange rates, the United States
adopted several programs that were designed to prevent devaluation of the dollar. Joint Tax'n Comm, supra note 42, at 10. These programs attempted to ease
the pressure on the United States, which had the effect of closing off United
States capital markets to foreign borrowers. Note, Eurobond Practice:Sources
of Law and the Threat of UnilateralNational Regulations, 20 VA. J. INT'L L.
505, 506 (1980). The programs also limited the ability of United States banks to
meet their customers' foreign financial needs and to otherwise engage in international banking. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 325. In order
to comply with the United States regulations and at the same time to provide a
broad range of international financial services, banks began to establish foreign
branches principally in the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. Between 1965
and 1974, the number of branch offices of United States banks in the Bahamas
and Cayman Islands increased from 1 to 124. Id. at 335-36. Virtually all of these
branches were (and are today) merely booking centers for financial transactions
negotiated elsewhere, but they gave United States banks access to reserve free
Eurocurrency markets. Further, since foreign loans booked and funded through
these shell branches did not affect the United States balance of payments, they
were exempt from the restrictions on foreign credits that applied to domestic
banking operations. Id. at 325.
The United States Government program to restrict capital outflow was ended
in 1974 and there were many who thought this would bring an end to offshore
markets. Note, Eurobond Practice: Sources of Law and the Threat of Unilateral NationalRegulations, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 506 (1980). By that time, however, offshore banking had become an essential part of international business.
Transnational corporations have found that with operations in several countries
they need access to a wide variety of credit facilities in different currencies, outlets for idle funds, and the means with which to transfer funds across national

boundaries. Transnational corporations also are interested in effecting their international financial transactions free of tax consequences and with a minimum
of exchange controls. Banking secrecy and relaxed disclosure requirements also
are important to some persons. Banks are eager to accommodate the expanded
and diverse needs of their customers for international financial services in locations that impose no reserve requirements and only a minimum of other banking
regulations.
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London is a good example of an operational center; the Bahamas
and the Cayman Islands generally are recognized as examples of
booking centers. 51 In offshore financial centers which are principally booking centers, almost all of the bank branches are
"shells." Typically, these branches are nothing more than a set of
ledgers managed and kept by an agent rather than a physical location where business is transacted. While deposits and loans are
formally lodged in these shells, the transactions are physically negotiated elsewhere and the funds may never actually be present
in the shell.5 2 Other financial centers, such as Hong Kong and
Singapore, are a combination of booking and operational centers.
In these locations, offshore banking transactions may be physically carried on or they may be simply booked through them.
Offshore financial centers are attractive to banks and their customers for a variety of reasons. First, taxes, or more correctly the
absence of taxes, have been an important reason certain locations
have become attractive as offshore financial centers. Also very important, however, are factors such as exchange control laws, local
reserve requirements, communications and travel facilities, language, the country's time zone, its commercial laws, and its political and social stability.53 The importance of nontax factors is
clearly illustrated by the fact that London, the largest offshore
center, is located in a high tax country. Bank secrecy laws may be
significant consideration for bank customers, although such laws
often do not benefit54the banks and on many occasions do not
shield the customers.

The highly vaunted tax advantages offered by the offshore
booking centers frequently do not benefit the banks. The Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, for example, are by far the most
important of the offshore booking centers for United States
banks.5 5 Operations in such centers generally are carried on
51. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 323-24.
52. Id. at 324-25. Of the 307 financial institutions licensed to do business in
the Bahamas, only about 55 of them have employees. The July, 1978 issue of
TAx HAVEN AND SHELTER REPORT states that on December 31, 1977, there were
about 14,000 people living in the Cayman Islands, which by that time had 8,158
registered companies, 237 banks and more telex machines per capita than any
other place on earth. Only a few of the banks are authorized to do business with

residents of the Cayman Islands, however. Id. at 15.
53. Id. at 324.
54.

Id.

55. At the end of 1978, United States banks had 139 branches in the Baha-
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through branches, which means the earnings of the branches are
immediately subject to United States tax. In these instances, the
principal effect of having no taxes in the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands is to reduce the amount of foreign tax credits the
banks could claim in the United States and increase the amount
of revenues received by the United States Government 56 Of
course, bank customers do benefit from the absence of taxes in
the Bahamas and Cayman Islands because that absence permits
them to receive their interest payments free of tax. The benefits
to bank customers from bank secrecy laws in the offshore booking
centers may be even more illusory, at least where United States
banks are involved. Generally, the United States Comptroller of
the Currency requires United States banks to maintain full
records in the United States of transactions booked through offshore branches. In all but three cases, the primary records of
United States bank branch operations in the Bahamas and the
Cayman Islands are maintained in the United States. Only secondary records, which are duplicates of the records kept in the
United States, are maintained in the Bahamas and the Cayman
Islands. 7 As a consequence, although the secondary records may
be protected by rigorous bank secrecy laws, United States bank

examiners and Internal Revenue Service personnel have full access through the primary records to all the names, loans, and deposits booked in the offshore branches of most United States

banks.
b. International finance subsidiaries and the Eurobond market
In the early 1960s a market for long-term debt securities demas and the Cayman Islands. These branches had assets of $90.9 billion. Id. at
324, 327.

56. Because of the limitations on the United States foreign tax credit, banks
find it more advantageous to operate in a tax-free environment than in a location where the taxes are higher than United States taxes. As between a tax-free

environment and one in which the taxes are equal to or less than the United
States tax, however, banks generally are fiscally neutral. Political pressures,
however, may favor the tax-free environment.
57. Oversight Subcomn. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 336-37. In the three
cases where primary records are not maintained in the United States, the banks

have class A licenses to engage in both international and domestic banking activities in the Bahamas. Because these bank branches are governed by local
bank supervisors, only minimal records are maintained in the United States. Id.

at 337.
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nominated in a currency, principally dollars, which was independent of the national markets in which the securities were sold,
began to develop. This market has come to be known as the
"Eurobond market.'8' s Debt securities sold in the Eurobond market normally are free of taxes withheld at source, and the conditions on which the bonds are issued put the risk of any withholding taxes on the issuer by requiring the issuer to pay the interest,
premiums and principal net of any tax withheld at source. Usually, if a withholding tax is imposed as a result of a change in law
or policy, the issuer may call the bonds. Transnational corporations offer bond issues not subject to the withholding taxes of
their home jurisdiction through international finance subsidiaries
(as is true with United States and German corporations) or
through specific statutory exemptions. Some statutory exemptions apply to interest paid to nonresidents generally (e.g., Norway and Sweden) or, more often, the exemption is contingent on
the bond being issued in a foreign currency (e.g., Australia, Canada, and Japan). Because Eurobonds traditionally are not subject to withholding taxes in the source country, an issuer could
not compete for funds in the Eurobond market if its interest payments were subject to withholding tax."
Where international finance subsidiaries are used, as in the
United States and Germany, the finance subsidiaries usually are
established as mere shell corporations, without employees or fixed
assets. Their primary purpose is to make offerings in the
Eurobond market and then lend the proceeds to the parent or
affiliated companies. United States corporations intending to use
the funds abroad sometimes form the finance subsidiaries in the
United States. As long as eighty percent or more of the subsidiary's gross income is from foreign sources, the interest payments
paid on the Eurobond are regarded as foreign source and the entity avoids the United States thirty percent gross withholding tax
58. Id. at 294. Eurobonds are distinguishable from Eurocurrency loans and
foreign bonds. The former are short and medium term bank loans of eurocurrencies. Note, Eurobond Practice,supra note 57, at 505 n.2. The latter are debt
obligations issued in a single country other than that of the issuer and denominated in the currency of the country in which they are placed. Id. While the
Eurobond market is relatively free of regulation, foreign bonds generally are
subject to substantial government regulation ranging from the registration requirements imposed by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
to permission from ministeries of finance and central banks. Id.
59. Joint Tax'n Comm., supra note 42, at 8.
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on interest.6 0 This gross income requirement generally is met if

the United States finance subsidiary invests the Eurobond proceeds in the foreign operations of the corporate group.
A more common way for United States corporations to gain access to the Eurobond market, especially if the bond proceeds are
to be used in the United States, is through the formation of a
finance subsidiary in a country having a tax treaty with the
United States under which United States source interest is exempt from the United States withholding tax. Such a tax treaty
also exempts interest paid by the finance subsidiary to the

Eurobond holders from the United States withholding tax."1 Typically, the Netherlands Antilles is used as the place of incorporation of international finance subsidiaries of United States corporations to take advantage of withholding tax exemptions available
under the tax treaty between the United States and the Netherlands Antilles. 2 In a standard financing arrangement, the finance
subsidiary borrows funds on the Eurobond market and loans
them to the United States parent or to other affiliates within the
corporate group. The United States parent almost always guarantees the finance subsidiary's Eurobonds, which are usually convertible into equity shares of the parent. Under this arrangement,
the United States parent can use the proceeds of the Eurobond
issue, but pays interest to the Netherlands Antilles finance subsidiary rather than directly to the foreign bondholders. Article
VIII of the treaty between the United States and the Netherlands
Antilles exempts the interest payments by the United States parent to the finance subsidiary from the United States withholding
60. I.R.C. § 861(a)(1)(B) (1981). See generally Lederman, The Offshore Finance Subsidiary: An Analysis of the Current Benefits and Problems, 51 J.
TAX'N 86 (1979); 215-2d T.M. PORTFOLIOS, InternationalFinance Subsidiaries.
61. Under United States source rules, interest paid by a foreign corporation
which derives 50 percent or more of its gross income from United States trade or

business may be treated as having a United States source and subject to the
United States witholding tax. I.R.C. § 861(a)(1)(D)(1981). Hence, a foreign
finance subsidiary which re-lent the Eurobond proceeds to the United States
parent for use in the United States would derive the bulk of its gross income

from the United States sources and, unless a tax treaty provided otherwise, its
interest payments to the Eurobond holders might be subject to the United
States gross withholding tax.
62. Approximately 95 percent of all international finance subsidiaries of
United States corporations are located in the Netherlands Antilles. See 215-2d
T.M. PORTFOLIOS, supra note 60.
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tax.13 The interest paid by the finance subsidiary to the foreign
bondholders is also exempt from the United States withholding
tax under either United States domestic law or article XII of the
tax treaty, and is exempt from tax in the Antilles under domestic
law.64 The net income of the finance subsidiary, which generally is
insubstantial because of the deduction for interest paid to the forin the Netherlands Antilles at
eign bondholders, usually is taxed
6 5
a rate of twenty-four percent.

As with the growth of offshore banking, the United States Government program aimed at curbing capital outflows and preventing devaluation of the dollar was a major catalyst in the emergence of the Eurobond market and the use of foreign finance
subsidiaries by United States corporations. The program included

several measures intended to encourage borrowing abroad by
United States corporations and closing off the United States market to foreign borrowers.6 The United States Internal Revenue
Service officially sanctioned the use of finance subsidiaries to
avoid the United States withholding tax and other restrictions in
a number of private and public rulings.6 7 The program to support
the dollar terminated in 1974 and the Internal Revenue Service
then revoked its sanction of finance subsidiaries." These developments led to a substantial decline in the issuance of Eurobonds
by United States corporations and, in fact, contributed to a major
disruption of the Eurobond market as a whole. In 1976 and 1977,
however, the market recovered and has grown considerably ever
since. " Despite the Internal Revenue Service's withdrawal of its
sanction of finance subsidiaries in 1974, the Service has not challenged these arrangements, and many bond issues by United
States corporations have been floated since 1975. 70 In fact, it is

estimated that indebtedness of United States corporations on
Eurobonds currently amounts to $3.5 to $4.0 billion.
63. Treaty with Netherlands Antilles, supra note 42.
64. Joint Tax'n Comm., supra note 42, at 9-10.

65. Lederman, supra note 60, at 88; PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO., 1979 DOING
28.

BUSINESS IN THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

66.

Note, Eurobond Practice,supra note 57, at 506.

67. See Rev. Rul. 110, 1973-1 C.B. 454; Rev. Rul. 416, 1972-2 C.B. 591; Rev.
Rul. 645, 1970-2 C.B. 273; Rev. Rul. 501, 1969-2 C.B. 233; Rev. Rul. 377, 1969-2
C.B. 231.
68. Rev. Rul. 464, 1974-2 C.B. 47.
69. Note, Eurobond Practice,supra note 57, at 506 n.12.
70. Lederman, supra note 60, at 88; Position Paper, supra note"3, at 17-18.
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c. Captive insurance companies
Captive insurance companies are insurance companies set up
by large industrial companies and other institutions, ranging from
skateboard parks to universities, to insure their own risks. They

have existed since the 1920s when companies such as ICI, British
Petroleum, Unilever, and British American Tobacco or their
precedessors all set up insurance subsidiaries. 1 In the past few
years, the use of captive insurance companies has grown from an
exotic tax avoidance scheme into a major part of many companies' corporate strategy.72 About eighty percent of the captive insurance companies are located in Bermuda. In 1978, the Bermuda
captives were estimated to have close to $1 billion in assets.7 3
Other locations, such as the Cayman Islands,
Guernsey, and the
74
Bahamas, compete for the captive business.
Captive insurance companies initially were established to avoid
taxes and exchange control restrictions. More recently, non-insurance companies76 have begun to use captives as a way of combating the steep escalation in insurance rates charged by commercial
insurance companies. Therefore, in addition to using captive insurance companies to reduce taxes, investors also are using them
to achieve nontax goals such as reducing commercial insurance
premiums paid on foreign risks, obtaining access to the reinsurance markets where premiums are lower and coverage often is
better, and establishing a funded reserve for losses. In the past, a
typical captive insurance situation would have a United States
company forming a captive insurance company in Bermuda.7 6
The captive could be owned directly by the United States parent
or by its affiliates or other subsidiaries. The Bermuda captive
71. Captives Fight for Their Lives, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 1978, at 78
[hereinafter cited as TH ECONOMIST].
72. Id.
73. Id. at 78.
74. For a description of a newly enacted insurance law intended to encourage
establishment of captive insurance companies in the Cayman Islands, see 80-10
TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 36 (1980).
75. In addition to companies, groups of United States doctors, lawyers, accountants, and even soil engineers concerned about the high premiums for liability insurance have formed captive insurance companies. Even funeral directors
apparently are considering forming captives to insure themselves against
whatever mistakes they might make. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 71, at 78.
76. United States citizens and residents have been the leaders in the captive
movement, but innovative European companies have not been far behind. Id.
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then would insure foreign risks of the United States corporate
group. To insulate itself from the risk of substantial losses, the
Bermuda captive generally reinsured all, or a substantial portion,
of the foreign risks. Premiums paid by the United States parent

or affiliates in other high tax jurisdictions generally were tax deductible by the payor. 78 Because reinsurance premiums usually
are lower then the primary insurance premiums charged by the
captive, the captive generally was able to show a profit and, because the profit surfaces in a tax haven, it could escape taxation.
The United States Internal Revenue Service does not always
agree that the premiums are deductible by the payor. In Revenue
Ruling 77-316, 7 the Service said a United States company paying
premiums to a captive insurance company could not deduct the
premiums to the extent the insurance risks were retained by the
captive because the risks retained by the captive produced no
risk-shifting or risk-distributing, which are essential components
in insurance. 80 In Revenue Ruling 78-338,81 the Service ruled that
insurance premiums could be deductible so long as they were reasonable in amount and based on sound actuarial principles. Revenue Ruling 78-338 involved a captive owned by thirty-one unrelated corporations, none of which held a controlling interest.
Apparently because the captive provided insurance for all of its
thirty-one shareholders, the Service characterized payments to
the captive as premiums for insurance and hence deductible. Revenue Rulings 77-316 and 78-338 had a significant impact on the
structure of captive insurance operations. The captives have
scrambled to convert themselves from shell corporations to insurance companies with a diversified insurance base. This has caused
captives to move into the reinsurance market as well as -the primary insurance market for unrelated parties."2

77. If the Bermuda captive insured United States risks, the premiums paid
to it would be characterized as having a United States source and the captive
might be deemed to be engaged in a trade or business for United States tax
purposes. This could cause the captive to be subject to United States tax. I.R.C.
§ 861(a)(7)(1981).
78. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 71, at 78.
79. 1977-2 C.B. 53.
80. See Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1978).
81. 1978-2 C.B. 107.
82. Financial Times, Nov. 24, 1980, at 24.
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d. Tax havens as conduits for foreign investment: "treaty
shopping"
Tax havens are widely used as conduits through which investments are made. Quite often, residents of one country (the "home
country"), desiring to invest in securities or real estate in another
country (the "host country"), will form a holding company in a
third country (the "tax haven") and then funnel the investment
capital through the holding company into the host country. This
structure is used because it offers substantial tax avoidance opportunities which result from the interaction of domestic tax legislation in the tax haven and a tax treaty between the host country and tax haven.
The use of a country as an investment conduit to obtain the
benefits of a tax treaty is referred to as "treaty shopping." Virtually every treaty in the vast network of bilateral income tax treaties is used to some extent by third party nationals, but some
treaties are especially attractive. 83 Tax treaties to which the
Netherlands is a party, for example, are attractive to residents of
third countries because the Netherlands is a financial center that
imposes no withholding taxes on interest paid by Dutch entities
to foreign persons, the internal income tax structure is favorable,
and the tax treaties provide for favorable treatment of interest
income paid to Dutch entities.' Tax treaties between the United
States and tax havens in the Caribbean are widely used by third
country residents to avoid 85 taxes on investments in the United
States. It is common for example, for third country residents to
use the Netherlands Antilles as a conduit for investments in
United States real estate, stocks and other securities, and active
business operations. The low domestic tax rates applicable to foreign investors in the Antilles coupled with favorable provisions in
the United States/Netherlands Antilles tax treaty make it possible for foreign investors to reduce their aggregate tax liability
substantially on a broad range of United States investments.86
For example, if a foreign person wanted to invest $1 million in
83. Position Paper, supra note 3, at 15.
84. See United States I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 7723035 (1977).

85. The tax treaties between the United States and Caribbean tax havens
also are used in conjunction with secrecy and confidentiality laws to evade taxes.
See infra text accompanying notes 107-15.
86. Vogel, Bernstein & Nitsche, Inward Investments in Securities and Direct Operations Through the Virgin Islands, 34 TAx L. REv. 321, 324-25.

472

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15.449

United States real estate, he could make the investment directly
in the United States or he could channel the investment through
the Netherlands Antilles. If he chose the direct route and was not
a resident in a country having a tax treaty with the United States,
the income from the real estate investment would be subject to
either a thirty percent gross withholding tax or to full taxation on
a net basis in the United States.87 On a subsequent sale or exchange of the real estate, the gain would be fully taxed in the
United States.88 Further, if the foreign person died owning the
United States real estate or made a gift of the real estate, the real
estate would be subject to the United States estate or gift tax.s
On the other hand, if the foreign person chose to channel the investment through the Netherlands Antilles, he might structure it
as follows. First, he would form a Netherlands Antilles holding
company to which he would advance $250,000 as equity. The Antilles holding company then would use the $250,000 as a down
payment to buy the United States real estate and would arrange
for a $750,000 mortgage held by the company's sole shareholder
either directly or through a financial intermediary.90 Assuming
the Antilles holding company is not too thinly capitalized, the
mortgage interest payments will be deductible in computing the
holding company's income subject to United States and Netherlands Antilles tax. Further, because of the interaction of the
United States/Netherlands Antilles tax treaty and Netherlands
Antilles domestic tax law, the interest payments received by the
financial intermediary or the sole shareholder will not be subject
to tax in either the United States or the Netherlands Antilles. As
a consequence, that portion of the foreign investor's total return
on his $1 million real estate investment which the mortgage interest represents escapes United States and Netherlands Antilles
tax. The balance of the foreign investor's return is taxed in the
United States on a net basis, but is exempt from Netherlands An87. I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1)(A), (d), 881(a)(1)(A), 882(d)(1981).
88. Prior to 1980, capital gains earned by foreign persons not engaged in a
United States trade or business generally escaped taxation. Beginning in 1980,
however, capital gains from the sale or exchange of United States real estate is
subject to tax. I.R.C. § 897.
89. I.R.C. §§ 2103, 2511(a).
90. A financial intermediary located in a tax haven (such as the Bahamas) is
useful if the sole shareholder would be taxed on the mortgage interest by the
country in which the shareholder is resident.
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tilles tax.9 1 When the foreign person sells the United States real
estate, the sale may be structured so the gain is taxed in neither
the United States nor the Netherlands Antilles.9 2 Finally, because
of the interposition of the Antilles holding company between the
United States real estate and the foreign person, the foreign person can transfer his interest in the real estate (represented by the
shares in the Antilles holding company) during his life or at death
free of the United States gift and estate taxes. Because the
Netherlands Antilles gift and death taxes usually do not apply to
nonresident shareholders of Antilles companies, such transfers
also should escape gift or death taxation in the Netherlands
93
Antilles.
The British Virgin Islands and Barbados also have a combination of tax treaties with the United States and favorable domestic
tax legislation making them attractive conduits for foreign investment in the United States. If a foreign person wanted to invest $1
million in United States corporate shares, he could acquire the
shares directly or have them acquired by a holding company in
the British Virgin Islands or Barbados. If the shares were acquired directly by the foreign person and he was not a resident in
a country with a tax treaty with the United States, the dividends
paid on the corporate shares would be subject to the thirty percent gross withholding tax imposed by the United States." Gains.
on the sale or exchange of the shares would be exempt from
United States tax, but if the person died owning the shares, the

shares would be subject to the United States estate tax.'5 On the
other hand, if the foreign person formed an "international business company" (IBC) in Barbados and the United States corporate shares were acquired by the IBC, he would avoid any United
States estate tax problems, and the dividends paid on the corporate shares would be subject to only a fifteen percent United
States withholding tax under the United States/Barbados tax

91. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREAsuRY,

supra note 45, at 43-44.

92. Id. Legislation was recently padsed in the United States which will tax
foreign investors on gains from sales or exchanges of United States real estate.
This legislation, however, will not operate to override tax treaty provisions for a
period of five years.
93. Kramer, Roeloffs & Walbloom, Business Operationsin the Netherlands
Antilles, 1980 TAx MGMT. (BNA) Portfolios at A-1, A-4.
94. I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A).
95. Id. § 2103.
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treaty." The dividends also would be subject to Barbadian tax,
but the tax rate on IBCs is only two and one-half percent and is
not paid until the dividends are distributed to the shareholder of
7
the IBC.
e. Transfer pricing and tax havens
Distortions in the allocation of profits and losses resulting from
transfer pricing practices represent one of the most important
and vexing problems involving international taxation and transnational corporations.9 The distortions occur when an enterprise
sets artificially high or low intra-firm transfer prices so that profits properly attributable to one jurisdiction are in fact allocated to
another jurisdiction. The jurisdiction to which the profits are allocated is frequently a tax haven.
Transfer pricing distortions occur in a countless number of
ways. Any intra-firm transfer payment can be used intentionally
or unintentionally to shift profits from one jurisdiction to another. Estimates indicate that during particular years in the 1970s
around fifty percent of United States exports, thirty percent of
United Kingdom exports, twenty-nine percent of Swedish exports, and fifty-nine percent of Canadian exports were intra-firm.
This shows that the potential for shifting profits through transfer
96. The 1945 United States/United Kingdom tax treaty was extended to
Barbados in 1959 with some modifications. Subsequent protocols and the new
United States/United Kingdom tax treaty do not apply to Barbados. See TAX
TREATiES

(CCH) United Kingdom

8127.

97. International Business Companies (Exemption from Income Tax) Act,
1965 (No. 50 of 1965); see INcoME TAx TREATIES, supra note 43, at 733-34.
98. Transfer pricing generally refers to the valuation attached to transfers of
goods, services, and technology between different affiliates of the same enterprise. Transfer pricing also occurs in instances such as a technology license or a
management services agreement in which the transferor and transferee are controlled by a single enterprise, irrespective of actual ownership. Hence, the essence of a transfer price is that it is not set by an independent transferor and
transferee in arm's length negotiations, but rather is within the discretion of a
single enterprise.
There is no doubt that a significant portion of the distortions produced by
transfer pricing occur as a result of intentional disregard of tax laws and exchange controls. Nevertheless, because the establishment of a transfer price usually is a very inexact process, and one on which reasonable people acting objectively can differ widely, it seems appropriate to assume that the distortions are
produced more by imperfections in the price setting process than by an explicit
intent to evade tax or other laws.
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prices is quite substantial. 9 Common examples of transfer pricing
distortions involving the use of tax havens are described below.
(i) Imports and exports of goods
By inflating the price of imports ("over-invoicing") and deflating the price of exports ("under-invoicing"), profits can be shifted
from the countries of purchase and sale to a third jurisdiction.
Profits can be shifted from both the country of the seller and of
the purchaser to a tax haven by interposing an affiliate organized
in the haven between the true seller and purchaser. Usually, in
transactions such as this, the tax haven sales subsidiary will be a
mere shell and the sales will be routed through the subsidiary
only on the books of the enterprise.100
(ii) Licensing of technology
If royalties under technology licensing agreements are set above
the prevailing market rate, profits properly allocable to the licensee can be shifted to the licensor, or a sub-licensor located in a
tax haven. Similarly, if the royalty rate chiarged by the licensor to
the sub-licensor located in the tax haven is below the market rate,
profits can be shifted from the licensor to the sub-licensor. Alternatively, if all the affiliates of an enterprise are charged what appear to be reasonable portions of the costs of developing technol-'
ogy under a cost sharing arrangement, but the rights to exploit
the technology are allocated disproportionately to affiliates located in tax havens, profits properly allocable to other jurisdictions are in fact attributed to tax havens. 101
(iii) Management services
Profits allocable to one affiliate are shifted elsewhere by overcharging the affiliate for services actually performed for it or
12
charging it for services that produce no benefit to it.
0 If the affiliate imposing the charges is located in a tax haven, the profits
99. See OECD Comwrrm ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, TRANsER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1979).
100. See C. IRISH, NoTEs ON TRANSFER PRICING ABUSES AND DEVELOPING
CouNTRIEs 3 (1978).
101. U.N. Group of Experts on Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, 7th Rep. at 35-41, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/79 (1978).
102. Id. at 41-45.
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reflected by such charges may escape taxation and exchange
controls.
(iv) Financial services
Overcharging or undercharging for financial services can shift
profits into tax havens even where the financial services originate
with unrelated third parties. For example, if a Botswana subsidiary of a global mining company borrowed directly on the
Eurocurrency market, the interest payments to the commercial
banks would be a deduction for the Botswana subsidiary and income to the unrelated commercial banks. If, however, -the loan
were channelled through a tax haven finance subsidiary and the
interest rate charged by the finance subsidiary was greater than
that charged by the commercial banks, the interest rate differential would reflect profits shifted from the Botswana subsidiary to
the tax haven subsidiary 103
2. Tax Haven Transactions Involving Evasion of Taxes and
Other Laws
a. Tax evasion and tax havens
Tax evasion is a willful, deliberate violation of law in order to
escape payment of a tax imposed on income by the laws of the
taxing jurisdiction. 1" Thus, while tax avoidance involves the reduction of taxes by legal means, tax evasion is a conscious failure
to comply with existing rules. The distinction between tax evasion
and tax avoidance is sometimes unclear because the tax laws vary
from one country to another. Illegal tax evasion in one jurisdiction may be permissible tax avoidance in another. Hence, the
characterization of a transaction as tax evasion or tax avoidance
in the international context depends on the laws applicable to the
transaction.10 5 Moreover, even within a single jurisdiction there
often is considerable debate as to whether a particular transaction
103. Id.
104. U.N. Group of Experts on Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, 3d Rep. at 69, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/166 (1972)[hereinafter cited
as 3d Rep.].
105. OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, TAX EVASION AND AvomANc 13

(1980); see generally ROTTERDAM

INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL

TAX AvoIDANcE-COUNTRY REPORTS

(1979).
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constitutes evasion or avoidance of the tax laws."° As a consequence, some of the relatively simple transactions described below may not involve tax evasion in all jurisdictions.
(i) Non-reporting of income and flight of the income to a tax
haven
One of the most direct forms of international tax evasion is the
willful failure to report income. Income earned from sources
outside a tax haven may be physically or electronically transferred to a tax haven where it resides under the cloak of the tax
haven's bank secrecy and corporate confidentiality laws.107 Items
frequently omitted from tax returns are salaries, investment income, business profits, and income from illegal activities. For example, if Y corporation sends employee A to work full time in
country P, A frequently will receive some portion of his compensation outside of P. On the tax return A files in P, A may report
only the compensation paid to him in P. Similarly, if B is a resident of Q country and derives investment income from X country, B may not report the investment income to Q, especially if
his investment is held in bearer form and income is paid into an
account maintained in a tax haven with rigorous bank secrecy
08
laws.
(ii) Creation of artificial deductions through the use of tax
haven entities

Taxpayers have created tax haven entities and then transferred
title to assets in order to generate rents, royalties, interest and
other expenses which are tax deductible for the taxpayers but tax
exempt for the tax haven entity. Also, in some instances, deductions are attributed to services allegedly performed by the tax ha106. For example, in United States v. Baskes, 442 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. Ill.
1977), a tax attorney was convicted of tax fraud for putting together transactions that produced short-term capital losses in the United States (which taxpayers could use to reduce their United States income tax liability) and equal
amounts of short-term capital gains which were paid to Bahamian trusts so as to
escape United States taxation. At the trial, another prominent tax attorney testified that in his opinion the transactions did not involve tax evasion. See Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 90-150.
107.

See generally T. CLARK & J. TIGuE, DmTY MoNFY (1973).

108. 3d Rep., supra note 104, at 69.
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ven entity, but which in fact are never performed. 10 9
(iii) Transfer of income-producing assets to tax haven entities
Taxes also may be evaded by transferring income-producing assets to tax haven entities. The assets transferred may consist of
stocks, bonds, rental properties, and intangibles which will generate a continuing stream of passive income, or property transferred
to the tax haven entity at an artifically low price so that gain on
resale of the property will accrue to the tax haven entity rather
than the taxpayer owning and controlling the entity. For example,
if X owned a valuable technological right which he wanted to license to a foreign person, X might illegally transfer the technology to a tax haven entity which then would license the technology
to the foreign person. The royalties paid under the licensing
agreement then could be accumulated in the tax haven and subjected to low or no income taxes. Similarly, if Y planned to sell
appreciated property, he could sell the property at a reduced
price to a tax haven entity owned entirely by Y and have the tax
haven entity sell the property. In this way, the bulk of the gain
escapes taxation in the country where Y resides. 11 0
(iv) Transfer of income-producing functions to tax haven
entities
By forming an entity in a tax haven and arranging to have services performed for unrelated third parties through the entity,
the taxpayers performing the services can shift substantial

amounts of compensation income to the tax haven entity. In the
typical case, the tax haven entity is a shell corporation incapable
of performing the services without the assistance of the controlling shareholders.""
(v)

Use of artificial loans

A fifth method of tax evasion involves the use of artificial loans
where the loan proceeds in fact are income being secretly accumulated in a tax haven made to a person in a high tax jurisdiction.
109. Oversight Subcomm. HearingsI, supra note 1, at 13-14; 3d Rep., supra
note 104, at 69-70.
110. For an example of an attempt to shift $700,000 in taxable gain to a
foreign situs trust, see United States v. Baskes, 442 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
111. 3d Rep., supra note 104, at 71.
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This technique enables the borrower to make full use of assets
previously concealed abroad while obtaining an interest expense
deduction. For example, if A is a United States resident who has
unreported income accumulating in a Bahamian bank, he could
arrange for a loan from the bank and use his accumulated income
on deposit with the bank as collateral. Because there is no tax
treaty between the United States and the Bahamas, the interest
payments made by A on the loan would be subject to the thirty
percent United States withholding tax. As a consequence, to
avoid the withholding tax and further disguise the true character
of the loan, A would arrange for the Bahamian bank to lend the
amount on deposit with the Bahamian bank to a Netherlands Antilles finance company. The Netherlands Antilles finance company then would lend the proceeds to A. Because of the United
States/Netherlands Antilles tax treaty, the interest payments received by the finance company would be exempt from United

States tax and would be taxed in the Netherlands Antilles only
on a net basis (i.e., after deduction of the interest expense paid to
the Bahamian bank). As a result, A evades United States taxes on
his income, gets the use of that income, and receives a deduction
for the interest paid for using the income.112

b. Evasion of nontax laws and tax havens
Although the majority of illegal activities involving tax havens
probably are tax motivated, tax havens also are used to evade
other laws. Exchange controls and host government profit participation requirements, for example, are evaded by transfer pricing
abuses that shift profits to tax haven entities. Securities laws,
particularly those requiring disclosure of share ownership, are
evaded by using corporate confidentiality laws and bearer shares
issued by tax haven entities to conceal common ownership and
control. 113 Tax havens are used to launder or maintain slush
112. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 19.
113. Tax haven entities also are used to legally avoid such laws. For example,
companies sometimes float Eurobonds through finance subsidiaries located in
tax havens (principally the Netherlands Antilles) to finance acquisitions in the

United States. Because the Eurobonds are beyond the scope of United States
securities laws, they can be floated without having to disclose the intended target of the acquisition effort. In 1978, Beatrice Foods, Texas International Air-

lines, and BASF all issued Eurobonds to pay for takeovers in the United States.
Note, Eurobonds Practice,supra note 57, at 508 n.22.
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funds for illegal political campaign contributions, bribes, kickbacks, and other illegal payments. The extent to which tax haven
entities are used in this fashion is unknown, but voluntary disclosures to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
by United States corporations indicate such use is (or at least,
was) not uncommon. One large American oil company, for example, created a secret fund used principally for illegal political contributions. False bookkeeping entries facilitated the disbursement
of over $2.8 million in corporate funds into two Swiss bearer stock
corporations. More than $1.3 million of the fund was returned to
the United States in cash and approximately $600,000 was used
for illegal political contributions. The funds remaining in the
Swiss corporations were distributed overseas in cash. 114 In an-

other case, sham corporations in Switzerland and Liechtenstein
concealed the activities of an aircraft company using bribes and
other questionable means to sell its product to foreign governments. In connection with the sales of some aircraft to foreign
governments, the aircraft were sold to a Swiss or Liechtensteinian
corporation which then inflated the final selling price to conceal

bribes and other questionable expenses."'
IV. THE INTERESTS AFFECTED BY TAX HAVEN AcTwITIEs

Tax haven activities significantly affect industrialized countries,
non-haven developing countries, the tax havens themselves, individuals and corporations engaged in international business, and
investment activities and persons using tax havens to evade tax
and other laws. In this part, the interests of all but those engaged
in illegal activities are discussed.
A.

IndustrializedCountries

The governments of most industrialized countries1 l6 recognize
that tax haven activities are neither entirely harmful nor entirely
beneficial to their interests. On balance, however, most industrial114. SEC Rep. Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices,
B-13 (1976)(submitted to the U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Ur-

ban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.).
115. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 170.
116. A few tax havens, such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Bermuda,

have per capita incomes high enough to put them in the class of industrialized
countries. Obviously, their views on tax havens are markedly different from
those of the non-haven industrialized countries.
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ized countries are hostile to the perpetuation and expansion of
tax haven activities. The industrialized countries are aware that
tax havens facilitate the inward flow of foreign investment, provide easy access to the Eurobond market for resident corporations
in some industrialized countries, and that haven activities give
the tax havens a measure of economic self-sufficiency they might
not otherwise attain. The industrialized countries are concerned,
however, about the revenue losses caused by tax haven activities
and, more importantly, they are concerned about the impact of
tax haven activities on both taxpayer equity and the willingness
of residents to comply with tax and other regulatory laws.
1. Revenue Losses
The obvious concern of industrialized countries is the revenue
lost because of haven activities.117 Although the revenue losses
from tax haven activities cannot be estimated, the indirect evidence available suggests the losses probably are not great, but
neither are they so small as to be insignificant. 18 There is no
doubt, for example, that the existence of tax havens makes international tax avoidance and evasion easier for the taxpaying public. In addition, the enormous growth in tax haven activities suggests more and more taxpayers take advantage of these tax
avoidance and evasion opportunities. On the other hand, anti-tax
haven legislation introduced in several industrialized countries in
recent years probably has curbed the revenue losses from tax haven activities. 19 Nevertheless, industrialized countries are concerned that tax havens facilitate tax avoidance and evasion and
117. Some tax haven activities actually generate revenue gains rather than
losses for industrialized countries. Offshore banking activities carried on in tax
havens by foreign branches of United States banks, for example, generate revenues for the United States which it would not otherwise have received. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 324-25.
118. Accounting for tax revenues lost due to the use of tax havens is virtually
impossible. No method presently exists for quantitatively measuring the total
loss of revenue from either legal or illegal use of tax havens. Id. at 15, 174-75,
224, 256; see Pepper, supra note 5, at 31. One estimate has put the revenue loss
to the United States as a result of funds hidden in tax havens at $2 billion. R.
KINSMAN, supra note 16, at 36. Any estimate in this area, however, should be
viewed with great skepticism. Id.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 174-213; IFA Seminar Paper, Recourse to Tax Havens-Use and Abuse: Anti-Tax Haven Legislation (Sept. 18,
1980).
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are responsible for lost revenues. This concern is reflected by
anti-tax haven legislation, by the recent government sponsored
studies on international tax avoidance and evasion,12 and by the
development of regional, bilateral, and national procedures for
exchanging tax information and curbing international tax avoidance and evasion."'
2. International Tax Avoidance and the Adverse Effect on
Taxpayer Equity
Since many tax haven transactions involve entities which are
merely conduits and shells represented by little more than
bookeeping entries, giving tax effect to these transactions conflicts
with the general proposition that taxes should be assessed on the
substance of the transaction rather than its form. It also means
that similarly situated taxpayers may have radically different tax
consequences due to the transaction's form. For example, foreign
investors who channel their investments into the United States
through shell corporations or other entities in the Netherlands
Antilles, British Virgin Islands, or Barbados receive more
favorable income tax treatment than similarly situated foreign
persons who make their investments directly in the United
States.12 2 The foreign investors using tax haven entities also receive more favorable tax treatment than United States residents
with direct holdings in similar investments. The disparity in tax
treatment resulting from formalistic differences erodes taxpayer
confidence in the basic fairness of the tax system and may have
an adverse impact on the willingness of taxpayers to comply voluntarily with the tax rules.
120. The United States Internal Revenue Service, for example, has just con-

cluded a special study on international tax evasion by United States taxpayers.
See R. GORDON, TAx HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS-AN
OVERviEW (1981); see also Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1.
121. See European Economic Community, Council Directive of 19 December
1977 concerning mutual assistanceby the competent authorities of the Member
States in the field of direct taxation; German-French Memorandum on Tax
Evasion/Avoidance on the InternationalLevel, 14 EUR. TAX'N 136 (1974). See
also European Economic Community, Council Resolution of 10 February 1975
on the measures to be taken by the Community in order to combat international tax evasion and avoidance.
122. INCOME TAX TREAT s, supra note 43, at 733-34.
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3. International Tax Evasion and the Adverse Impact on
Voluntary Compliance with Tax and Other Laws
Any system or facility encouraging evasion of a government's
laws is a source of legitimate concern to that government because
the system or facility promotes inappropriate, inequitable, or
harmful conduct. Gaps in enforcement procedures in the industrialized countries combined with the rigorous secrecy and confidentiality laws in tax havens undoubtedly makes it relatively easy for
residents of the industrialized countries to disguise or conceal
their illegal activities from their home governments. The home
governments are justifiably concerned about both the gaps in
and the secrecy and confidentiality
their enforcement procedures
23
laws in tax havens.1

The major concern of the governments, however, is the broader
impact of international evasion of tax and other laws on the willingness of the citizenry to comply with such laws voluntarily. In
Western societies, where individual liberties are highly prized,
voluntary compliance with laws is a cornerstone of the society.
Voluntary compliance is enhanced if the laws are perceived as fair
and evenly enforced. International evasion of tax and other laws
erodes public confidence in the fairness and enforceability of the
laws. As a consequence, governments of some industrialized countries view international tax evasion as a significant threat to the
willingness of taxpayers generally to comply with the tax laws.
Further, the other illegal activities concealed within tax havens
erode confidence in the legal system.
4. Tax Differentials and Capital Export Neutrality
Tax differentials arise because countries impose tax at different
rates and apply varying theories to determine which income is
taxable. As a result, effective tax rates vary considerably from one
jurisdiction to the next.124 The opportunity to take advantage of
tax differentials arises because many industrialized countries do
123. Of course, the governments should not overlook the possibility that tax
evasion and other illegal activities may be a reflection of the citizenry's opinion
of the burdens of the governments' tax and regulatory policies. R. KINSMAN,

supra note 17, at 8; Pepper, supra note 5, at 32.
124. Musgrave, International Tax Differentials for Multinational Corporations: Equity and Efficiency Considerations,IMPACT OF MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND DEvELoPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TECHNICAL PAP Rs: TAxATION (STIEAS/11) (1974).
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not tax foreign source profits earned by foreign subsidiary corporations until the profits are distributed from the foreign subsidiary to the domestic parent. As a consequence, if a corporation
residing in a high tax industrialized country has active foreign operations in a low tax country, it can defer paying the higher taxes
in the industrialized country simply by incorporating the active
operations in the foreign country and accumulating the income
there or shifting it to a tax haven. Organized labor and its government supporters believe this opportunity to defer the higher taxes
in the industrialized countries creates an incentive for foreign investment at the expense of domestic investment. 12 5 As a result,
legislation has been proposed to eliminate or reduce the opportunities to defer taxes through the creation of foreign subsidiar-

ies."'6 The major impact of these legislative proposals, if passed,
will be in the export processing zones created by many developing
countries 12 7 and in the rapidly growing, low tax economies, such
as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Because
several industrialized countries already have enacted anti-tax haven legislation, the impact of any new proposals to curb tax deferral probably will not be great.

5. The Favorable Impact of Tax Havens on Access to the
Eurobond Market and Foreign Investment Flows Into
Industrialized Countries
a. The Eurobond market
Tax havens undoubtedly offer enterprises in industrialized
countries easy access to the Eurobond market. For example, most
United States -corporations enter the Eurobond market through
international finance subsidiaries formed in the Netherlands Antilles.1 28 United States companies would face higher costs for bor125. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIENT'S 1978 TAX
PROGRAM 282 (1978). The argument against tax deferral has been asserted most
vigorously in the United States. Ironically, critics in the United States ignore
very substantial tax incentives, such as the investment tax credit and liberal

depreciation allowances that are available only for domestic investment in the
United States.
126.

Id.

127. GLOBAL AND CONCEPTUAL STUDIES SECTION, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR
INDUSTRIAL STUDIES, UNIDO, supra note 96.
128.

Lederman, supra note 60, at 86.
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rowed funds without access to the Eurobond market. This in turn
could reduce the competitiveness of United States enterprises
and have an inflationary impact on the United States economy.
On the other hand, if the traditional routes to the Eurobond market through tax havens were blocked, it is reasonable to assume
that the market and potential borrowers would develop alternative avenues bypassing tax havens. As a consequence, tax havens
probably should be viewed as helpful rather than indispensable
for gaining access to the Eurobond market.
b. Inward investments into industrialized countries
Unquestionably, the opportunity to channel investments into
industrialized countries through tax havens to take advantage of
benefits available under tax treaties and tax haven legislation has
a major impact on the structure of these investments. In addition,
it has been suggested that the favored tax treatment accorded
these investments may increase their volume.12 For this reason,
some people urge the United States government to move slowly
and carefully before restricting use of tax havens. 8 0
6. Tax Havens and Self-Sufficiency
Many tax havens are small, resource poor areas which were or
are dependent on an industrialized country. Vanuatu and the Bahamas, for example, are former British colonies. The British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos, and the Cayman Islands are
still British colonies with varying degrees of autonomy in internal
affairs. Similarly, the Netherlands Antilles still has a formal dependency arrangement with the Netherlands. Being relatively
poor, these areas drain the resources of the former or existing colonial power. Consequently, to the extent tax haven status benefits the tax havens, it reduces their dependence on the former or
existing colonial power and diminishes the drain on the colonial
power's resources. It is unclear whether this fact played a role in
the establishment of some areas as tax havens, but it certainly is
a reason some industrialized countries may not be disturbed by
their continued existence.
129. Oversight Subcomm. HearingsII, supra note 40, at 6-7; Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 282.
130. Birger, Billion-dollar Money Funnel into S. Florida, Miami Herald,
Aug. 4, 1980 (Business Monday Section), at 1.
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7. Tax Havens as Allies of the Western Industrialized
Countries
Because of low or nonexistent tax rates and the absence of exchange controls or other government regulations, foreign investors
consider tax havens paradigms of the capitalist economy. Therefore, the tax havens have strong political and economic ties with
the Western industrialized countries. Because, in many cases, the
ties stem principally from the haven status of the tax havens, radical measures by the industrialized countries to eliminate or minimize the use of tax havens may have a corrosive effect on these
ties and may lead to destabilization of the very governments
which are staunch allies of the industrialized countries.18 L As a
consequence, the interests of the industrialized countries clearly
cannot be defined exclusively in economic terms. There is a significant political dimension that requires careful consideration.
B. Non-Haven Developing Countries
Though the governments of non-haven developing countries
have many of the same interests as their counterparts in industrialized countries, the interests of the non-haven developing countries center more on the revenues and foreign exchange lost due
to tax haven activities. There is little doubt that substantial
sumst1 2 are shifted from non-haven developing countries to tax
havens through transfer pricing and other transactions of questionable legality and that the shifting of such sums has an adverse impact on the development programs of the non-haven developing countries. On the other hand, it is not clear that the
elimination of tax havens would materially improve the position
of the non-haven developing countries. In fact, it is possible that
the absence of regulation or taxes in tax havens gives transnational corporations greater flexibility in the allocation of their resources and that this flexibility actually benefits some of the nonhaven developing countries.

131. See generally Position Paper, supra note 3.
132. In absolute terms, the sums lost by non-haven developing countries due
to tax haven activities may not be great; but compared to total resources of the
non-haven developing countries, the losses-especially the foreign exchange
losses-are often considerable.
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1. Revenue Losses
As with the industrialized countries, revenue and foreign exchange losses resulting from tax haven activities are the most obvious concern of the non-haven developing countries. Although
empirical evidence on the amounts lost through tax haven activities is sparse, such evidence as there is suggests that the losses
probably are sufficiently substantial to have an adverse effect on
economic development in the non-haven developing countries.
First, it is clear that substantial amounts are shifted out of nonhaven developing countries solely as a result of transfer pricing
manipulations. In one study in a non-haven developing country,
for example, imports above world market prices for comparable
products during the period from 1975 to 1976 was found to average sixteen percent for metals and twenty-five percent for chemicals. This overpricing caused a balance of payments loss estimated at $72 million. " A parallel study of transfer pricing for
three important export products showed that underpricing of exports also was taking place, but in this case it was not possible to
arrive at an estimate of the balance of payments loss. In another
non-haven developing country, the total foreign exchange loss on
all import and export transactions by transnational corporations
was estimated to be about $80 million annually.1 ' Additional

studies involving other non-haven developing countries suggest a
pervasive pattern of transfer pricing manipulations throughout
the Third World. 3 5 It also is clear that transfer pricing manipulations are not the only way funds are shifted out of non-haven developing countries. Other devices, such as concealment and flight
of assets as well as material understatements of taxable income,
which are sometimes facilitated by a misallocation of home office
expenses, certainly add to the balance of payments losses of the
non-haven developing countries.136
It is impossible to quantify the extent to which funds shifted
from non-haven developing countries surface in tax havens, but it
is known that tax haven entities are widely employed in interna133. UNCTAD SEMINAR PROGRAMME, REPORT SERIEs No. 2, INTRA-FRM
TRANSACTIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON TRADE AN

DEVELOPMENT (1978).

134. Id.
C. IRISH, supra note 100, at 5.
136. See generally MAKANI, THE CONTROL
135.

OF TRANSFlR PRICING AND

LATED MALPRACTICES IN DEVELOPING COuNTRIEs: THE TANzANIA4 EXPERIENCE

(1978).
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tional evasion and avoidance. 37 Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that a significant portion of the shifting from non-haven
developing countries is to tax havens. It does not follow, however,
that the existence of tax havens is a major reason funds are
shifted out of the non-haven developing countries nor that elimination of tax havens would significantly benefit the non-haven
developing countries. The shifting of funds out of industrialized
countries into tax havens appears to occur principally for tax reasons.13 8 Where non-haven developing countries are involved, however, the shifting of funds occurs for a wide variety of reasons,
such as stringent exchange controls, political instability or the
threat of political instability, the desire to minimize profits paid

to indigenous shareholders, or the desire to understate local profits so as to discourage competition or government scrutiny. In a
great many instances it appears that tax factors are of only secondary importance. Hence, if tax havens were eliminated, it is quite
possible that a substantial amount of the funds presently shifted
out of the non-haven developing countries into the tax havens
would simply surface in other jurisdictions such as relatively low
tax industrialized countries. Therefore, the elimination of tax
havens might not materially benefit the non-haven developing
countries. It certainly would not benefit them as much as eliminating the reasons funds currently are shifted out of the non-haven developing countries.
2. Increased Investment Flows into Non-Haven Developing
Countries
The possible benefits tax havens offer the non-haven developing countries should not be overlooked. First, the existence of tax
havens and the opportunities to shift funds to them through
transfer pricing manipulations and related activities may encourage transnational corporations to invest in non-haven developing countries. Tax havens give transnational corporations
greater flexibility to cope with negative factors, such as political
and economic instability, which are perceived as endemic in many
parts of the Third World. Without that flexibility, transnational
137. See 3d Rep., supra note 104, at 71; M. EDWARE.S-KFR, INTERNATIONAL
(1980).
138. Of course, the establishment of offshore banking facilities and international finance subsidiaries in tax havens is clearly prompted by both tax and
non-tax reasons. See Joint Tax'n Comm., supra note 105, at 11.
TAX STRATEGY
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corporations might give greater weight to the negative factors and
place their resources in less risky ventures in more established
economies. In addition, with their low or nil tax rates and the
absence of exchange controls or other regulatory measures, tax
havens are the quintessence of an open market. The low or nil tax
rates make it possible for private sector capital to accumulatemore rapidly in the tax havens than in other countries with even
moderate tax rates. The absence of exchange controls and other
government regulations enables investors to allocate their capital
strictly on the basis of market considerations. As a consequence,
investors may have a greater stock of capital available for investment in non-haven developing countries as well as other places
and the freedom to take advantage of new investment

opportunities.
Of course, not all non-haven developing countries benefit from
an investment flow that is more responsive to the marketplace.
Countries just entering or reentering the competition for foreign
investment, such as Zimbabwe, Chile, Jamaica, the newly independent countries in the Caribbean and Pacific, and the dynamic
economies in Asia, may benefit from the rigors of the marketplace. These countries may have less reason to be critical of the
existence of tax havens. On the other hand, non-haven developing
countries which are concentrating on maintaining their stock of
foreign investment and curbing their revenue and foreign exchange losses resulting from tax haven transactions may sense
that tax havens have more disadvantages than advantages.
C.

Individuals and CorporationsEngaged in International
Business and Investment Activities

The interests of individuals and corporations engaged in legitimate international business and investment activities can be easily stated. The low or nil taxes in tax havens leave greater after
tax profits; the absence of exchange controls gives individuals and
corporations the opportunity to allocate resources on the basis of
economic considerations; and the minimum of government regulations generally insures that business and investment activities
channelled into or through tax havens will not have the added
administrative costs of complying with burdensome regula-

tions-costs which are substantial and growing in other parts of
the world. In addition, the bank secrecy and confidentiality in
corporate matters found in many tax havens give individuals and
corporations the opportunity to carry on their activities in rela-
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tive anonymity, out of the view of their competitors and free from
the fear of politically and economically motivated sanctions.
D.

Tax Havens

Policy makers in tax haven countries generally have attempted
to use haven status to spur economic development. Although a
few wealthy countries are considered to be tax havens," 9 most tax
havens are quite poor, lack indigenous resources, and have small
domestic markets. Within these countries, the tendency has been
to view tax haven status as not just the best mechanism for stimulating foreign investment and economic development, but as the
only mechanism available in the present economic climate. Thus,
the particularly relevant questions with respect to tax havens are
first, what are the benefits and costs to be derived from haven
status, and second, whether or not tax haven status will act as a
catalyst for broad based economic development.
1. Ostensible Benefits from Tax Haven Status
Tax haven status is thought to generate increased revenues and
foreign exchange, greater employment, tourism and construction
activities, improved infrastructure, and in some cases more
favorable access to financing for local development. 140 The most
consistently visible benefit is the increase in government revenues
and foreign exchange attributable to haven activities. The impact
of tax haven status on employment, tourism, construction, and
access to capital is more speculative, but, in the aggregate, is
probably favorable to the tax haven economy. The improvements
in communications and travel facilities probably are more accurately characterized as a cost of tax haven status rather than a
benefit.
a.

Government revenues and foreign exchange

The clearest benefit from haven status is the increase in revenues. Tax havens do not offer their services for free, but instead
haven entities and activities are subjected to a variety of fees and
taxes.141 For example, in the Netherlands Antilles in 1979, direct
139. E.g., Bermuda, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland.

140. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT OF BARBADOS, OFFSHORE BANKING IN BARBADOS 6
(1980).
141.

Oversight Subcomm. HearingsI, supra note 1, at 141-64. See generally
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tax revenues from haven activities were about $44 million, thirty
percent of the government's total revenues. 42 In the British Virgin Islands in 1979, the government took in $217,000 in fees from
tax haven activities, with revenues rising to $400,000 for the first
eight months of 1980, The total government budget in the British
Virgin Islands for 1980 was $11.5 million. 43 In the Bahamas,
banks and trust companies paid $750,000 for licenses to do business in 1977. Another $2 million was paid for licenses and registration fees on behalf of the clients of the banks and trust companies; and over $800,000 was paid by tax haven entities for work
permits for expatriates.' The revenues are doubly important because they represent foreign exchange to the haven countries. Because many of the haven countries import almost all their capital
and consumer goods, the foreign exchange earned by the haven
activities often is critical to the economic health of the haven
countries. 45
b. Employment
Increased employment is another benefit attributed to tax haven status. It appears, however, that there is a tendency to exaggerate the number of jobs created by tax haven activities. 4 6 Tax
haven entities normally are used as conduits or shells so that
often no significant business activities are carried out in the haven countries. 47 For example, in 1977 there were 276 financial
institutions licensed to do business in the Bahamas (the number
has since grown to 306), but only fifty-five of them employed any
staff.14 Nevertheless, the financial sector in the Bahamas does
employ about 2,000 people or three percent of the employed work
force, and about ninety percent of the employees are BahaA.

ANDERSON, TAX AND TRADE GUIDE--HONG KONG 10, 22-23, 46 (1978); A. ANDERSON, TAx AND TRADE GUIDE-SINGAPORE (1977); PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO.,
1981 DOING BusINEss IN THE BAHAMAS 37-39; PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO., 1978
DOING BUSINESS IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS.

142.
143.
Times,
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Position Paper, supra note 3, at 8-10.
British Virgin Islands: Mixed Blessings of an Oil Boom, Financial
Sept. 16, 1980.
BAHAMAS HANDBOOK 205 (1979).
Position Paper, supra note 3, at 8-9.
de Jantscher, supra note 3, at 33.
Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 20, 323-24.
Financial Times, July 22, 1980, at 30.
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mian. 49 This makes the financial sector the third largest employer in the Bahamas after tourism and the government. Similarly, in the Netherlands Antilles, it has been estimated that the
offshore sector employs about 1,000 persons, which is about one
and three-tenths percent of the employed work force. 150 Norfolk
Island, a possession of Australia and a former tax haven, is another illustration. In 1972, more than 1,450 companies were incorporated on the island - nearly one per inhabitant. Nevertheless,
the tax haven sector apparently was benefitting only twenty-five
residents of the island because much of the business was being
done by lawyers and accountants in Australia.""' It appears there
is a similar pattern between the United States and the tax havens
in the Caribbean, as a substantial amount of the bookkeeping, accounting, and legal work occasioned by tax haven activities is
done in the United States by United States professionals. 52 It
has been estimated, for example, that ninety-five percent of the
foreign real estate transactions channelled through the Netherlands Antilles are initiated in a lawyer's office in Miami or Fort
Lauderdale.153 Of course, increased employment has a multiplier
effect so that the net gain in employment in the haven countries
as a result of tax haven activities should be somewhat higher than
the figures indicated above. Further, although the level of employment in tax haven activities is not substantial in absolute
terms, it is of considerable significance in tax havens such as the
Netherlands Antilles and the Bahamas, where unemployment already is approximately nineteen percent and twenty to twentyfive percent, respectively. 1 "
c. Tourism
Tax haven activities probably increase tourism in many haven
countries, although the effect has not been quantified with any
precision. Good climate combined with favorable fiscal and regulatory regimes make many tax havens attractive sites for interna149. Id.
150. Position Paper, supra note 3, at 11.
151. de Jantscher, supra note 3, at 33.
152. Birger, How Lawyers Set up Tax-Haven Companies, Miami Herald,

Aug. 4, 1980 (Business Monday Section), at 21.
153. Id.

154. Financial Times, July 22, 1980, at 29; Position Paper, supra note 3, at
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tional business and finance conferences. Also, many people setting
up or overseeing tax haven transactions may combine a business
trip with a holiday in the tax havens. 155 In the Bahamas, for example, it was estimated that in 1977 the tax haven sector attracted over 4,600 clients, potential clients, directors, inspectors,
and similar persons for business meetings with executives of
banks and trust companies engaged in haven activities.156 The improved communications and travel facilities that go with being a
tax haven and the additional publicity a tax haven receives
1 57
among wealthy taxpayers also may promote tourism indirectly.
d. Construction
Tax haven status may have a favorable effect on construction
activities, although the extent to which the local economy benefits
again may be exaggerated. Because tax haven entities generally
serve as conduits or shells for transactions, the facilities necessary
to accommodate a large volume of haven transactions may be
minimal. The presence of many holding companies and other
shell trusts and corporations in tax havens often is manifested by
little more than a name plate. 158 Nevertheless, the new buildings
housing offshore financial activities in the Bahamas, Panama,
Bahrain, and elsewhere are evidence that haven status can have a
favorable impact on construction activities. 59 It is not clear, however, how much the increased construction benefits the local
economy because frequently most of the building materials and a
good portion of the labor are imported. For example, sources in
one tax haven claimed that in the recent construction of a $10
million offshore banking facility "[e]verything was imported except the sand." Further, even when the local economy participates in increased construction activities, there is the additional
question of whether the benefit will be a sustained one which
stimulates other sectors of the economy or is likely to be highly
cyclical with a depressing effect on the rest of the economy when
construction activities slow down. Where the increased construction activities employ persons who would not otherwise be work155. GOVERNMENT OF BAnnAos, supra note 140, at 6.
156.

BAHAMAS HANDBOOK 203-04 (1979).

157. de Jantscher, supra note 3, at 34.
158. Joint Tax'n Comm., supra note 42, at 9.
159. See, e.g., FinancialTimes Survey - Arab Banking, Financial Times,
Sept. 22, 1980, at XI.
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ing, even sporadic employment would seem better than none at
all. On the other hand, where the increased construction activities
discourage people from developing alternative, more stable employment opportunities, the effect of the construction activities
on the tax haven economy may be minimal or negative.
e.

Communications and travel facilities

Tax haven status generally leads to improvements in communications and travel facilities. Other than the favorable effect such
improvements may have on tourism, however, it is difficult to see
how the indigenous population benefits much from these improvements. A good portion of the indigenous population in tax
havens lives on relatively meager incomes and is many years away
from being concerned with the quality of satellite communications or international travel. A more basic issue is whether the
improvements in communications and travel facilities should be
characterized as a marginal benefit or as a cost to the local economy of the attracting haven activities.
f. Access to international capital markets
The presence of tax haven activities may have a positive impact
on the availability of capital for local projects in the haven country. Many of the banks operating in tax havens carry on only offshore business-that is, they are not licensed to do business
within the local economy. Tax havens have found, however, that
the existence of offshore activities within the country gives the
banking community some exposure to their country and makes it
easier for them to obtain financing for local governmental and
private sector activities. The Bahamian Government, for example,
recently had no difficulty placing an $11 million bond issue, a fact
which some attributed to the Bahamas' status as a tax haven and
an offshore financial center.
2.

Ostensible Costs of Tax Haven Status

While it appears that tax havens do benefit from their haven
status, the benefits should not be viewed in isolation, but should
be balanced against the costs associated with that status. Though
these costs often are not readily apparent, they exist and seem to
be greatest in countries heavily dependent on tax haven activities.
In the least developed tax haven countries, which often depend
on their haven status for revenues, foreign exchange, and employ-
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ment opportunities, it appears that the short term opportunity
costs of haven status are nearly zero because the tax haven activities draw on untapped labor and generate foreign exchange and
government revenues which would not otherwise be created. In
fact, in some of the least developed tax havens, the decision to
have neither an income tax nor exchange control restrictions may
be due to an absence of cash income or foreign exchange transactions rather than a conscious desire to establish a tax haven.
These countries may believe any benefits derived from haven status produce a net gain for the haven country and justify perpetuating haven status. Opportunity costs, however, are rarely zero.
Usually the costs will be reflected in the diminished capacity of
the haven government to respond to varying political, economic,
and social issues, an unhealthy dependence on the highly volatile
tax haven sector to the exclusion of other, more stable economic
activities, and the diversion of scarce resources away from the
critical needs of the indigenous population. There also may be
added social unrest as a result of an influx of expatriate personnel
to work in the tax haven sector.
a. Diminished flexibility and an unhealthy dependence on tax
haven status
The level of tax haven activities in any particular haven country varies widely for four reasons. First, tax haven activities often
have only a formal connection with any tax haven. The real economic activity usually takes place elsewhere. As a consequence,

formal transactions into or through a particular tax haven can be
rapidly routed elsewhere if necessary.160 Second, the increased
competition among countries for the haven business insures that
each country's hold on its haven activities is somewhat precarious. For example, the competition between some established offshore financial centers, such as Hong Kong and Singapore,1 6 is
already intense. In addition, several countries recently have enacted or have considered enacting special legislation designed to
attract the offshore banking business. Barbados, Puerto Rico, and
the Phillippines all have relatively new offshore banking legislation,11 2 and the United States is considering a special interna-

160. de Jantscher, supra note 3, at 34; Financial Times, July 22, 1980, at 30.
161. Soin, supra note 28, at 9.
162. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT OF BARBADos, supra note 140.
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tional banking enclave-probably in New York City.6 3 The level
of competition contributes to the tenuousness of each haven
country's hold on the offshore banking operations conducted
within its borders. 164 Third, the attractiveness of a large portion

of tax haven transactions depends on the implicit or explicit acquiescence of the industrialized countries. The industrialized
countries have the power to greatly curtail tax haven activities
and, as a consequence, such activities can continue for only as
long as the industrialized countries do not exercise that power.
For example, the United States easily could keep its corporations
from using international finance subsidiaries organized in tax
havens by refusing to recognize their separate existence for tax
purposes. The United States already has done this with some captive insurance companies.1 5 The accumulation of profits in holding companies organized in tax havens could be curbed if industrialized countries taxed all income earned by or on behalf of
their resident individuals and corporations or by abolishing tax
deferral for foreign source income. 6 " Fourth, tax haven transactions are a reflection of world economic and political conditions.
Conflicts and chaos in one part of the world lead to a flight of
capital from the troubled area, through tax havens into what is
perceived to be a more stable environment.
The volatile nature of tax haven transactions is harmful to the
haven countries in at least two ways. First, tax haven status essentially is a statement by the haven government that for foreign
investors, the haven country is a free market overseen by a benign, non-interfering government with very conservative fiscal
policies. Because of the volatility of tax haven transactions, just a
hint that a haven country is planning to alter any of the underpinnings of its haven status can have a significant impact on the
level of haven activities in that country. As a consequence, a haven government faced with critical political, economic, or social
problems has a limited range of responses available to solve the
problems while avoiding damage to its tax haven sector. Many tax
havens, for example, are faced with high unemployment and in163.
164.
165.
166.

See Financial Times, Nov. 20, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 329.
Rev. Rul. 316, 1977-2 C.B. 53.
At a minimum, such legislation would change what is presently a fairly

widespread tax avoidance technique into tax evasion, which presumably fewer
people would be willing to attempt.
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flation. Traditionally, countries adopt or increase taxes to combat
these problems. But, for countries committed to fiscal restraint,
as many of the haven countries are, such a response is beyond the
realm of political feasibility. The adoption of or increase in direct
taxes, or even the suggestion of such changes, probably would ad-

versely alter foreign investors' perceptions of the country as an
attractive place in which to carry on haven activities. Second, because the volatility of tax haven activity results from events occuring outside haven countries, they have little or no control over
the growth or contraction of the tax haven sector. Where the haven sector is an important component of a country's economy,
growth and prosperity or stagnation and depression are determined largely by irrational, widely fluctuating circumstances extrinsic to the country. Though to some extent this is inevitable in
small economies with close ties to international business, dependence upon tax haven transactions means the haven country may
be subject to an even greater risk of economic upheaval. The
Netherlands Antilles, for example, found that just the threat of
renegotiation of the United States/Netherlands Antilles tax
treaty, which was unilaterally announced by the United States
Treasury in July, 1979,67 had a negative impact on Antilles revenues.18 8 Also, in 1973, a small change made by the United States
Congress in the taxation of interest payments remitted abroad
caused a decline in Netherlands Antilles Government revenues.1 6 9
Similarly, a political or economic scandal, whether rumored or
real,1 70 or changes in the myriad external factors making a particular tax haven attractive can have a significant effect on tax haven activities in that country.
Where tax haven status has a zero or almost zero opportunity
cost, fluctuations in tax haven activities are just an unavoidable
consequence of being a tax haven. In some cases, however, the
existence of tax haven status and the entrenchment of the interests benefiting from haven status have diverted haven govern-

ments' attentions away from the development of more stable and

167. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,758 (1979).
168. Position Paper, supra note 3, at 10.
169. Oversight Subcomm. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 297.
170. The Jean Doucet affair in the Cayman Islands and the breach of confidentiality by Michael Wolstencroft of Castle Bank in the Bahamas had significant effects on tax haven activities in those countries. See R. KINSMAN, supra
note 16, at 69-75, 89-94.
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possibly more profitable economic activities. Hence, a hidden cost
of tax haven status may be the failure of some haven governments to consider alternatives to or changes in tax haven status.
In such instances, the haven economies unnecessarily may be
kept in the position of heavy, vulnerable dependence on haven
activities.

b. Diversion of scarce resources
In the least developed haven countries, an important cost of
haven status may be the diversion of resources from social and
economic projects in order to produce the infrastructure necessary to be a successful tax haven. The costs of telecommunications equipment, airports, hotels, and related facilities may divert
scarce resources from projects such as hospitals and schools. Even
where the haven infrastructure is financed in part by concessionary loans or grants to the government, the cost may be a diminished capacity to borrow or a diminished availability of concessionary assistance. By focusing attention on highly visible projects
such as airports and hotels, government planners also may be unable or unwilling to spend time on less visible, but more critical
projects for the indigenous population.
c. Social pressure
Tax haven activities often are preceded by an influx of expatriate personnel to work in the dominant positions in the tax haven
sector. In more than a few tax havens, the inability or unwillingness of these expatriates to integrate themselves into the local
community and their relatively favored, lavish lifestyles cause
171
some unrest within the indigenous population.

3. Tax Haven Status as a Catalyst for Development
There appears to be no published data on the issue of whether
tax haven status can act as a catalyst for development. Nevertheless, some useful generalizations can be developed from the information available. It seems improbable that haven activities alone
can promote sustained, stable economic growth benefiting a large
proportion of the indigenous population. Tax haven activities are
171. Lessard, Profile:A Close Gathering,NEw

YORKER,

April 16, 1979, at 43.
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volatile, benefit a small enclave of people, and lack the substance
necessary to provide an appropriate base for economic development. As a consequence, if tax haven status encourages development, it probably is due to linkages with other sectors of the
economy. The stronger the linkages, the more likely it is that tax
haven status will stimulate development. Clearly, the volatile nature of tax haven activities will have a negative impact on the
substantiality and durability of any linkages. Nevertheless, in the
more established tax havens, there usually are linkages between
the tax haven sector and tourism, construction, the training of
clerical and technical personnel, and the development of local
financial and professional expertise. The linkages to tourism may
be tenuous, but whatever benefits there are will be increased
greatly if tourism in turn develops linkages to the rest of the
economy. In other words, if consumer goods and a good portion of
the essential services are imported, the linkages and benefits to
the local economy will be minimal. On the other hand, if a conscious effort is made to use indigenous resources and personnel,
the benefits in terms of employment, government revenues, and
foreign exchange will be substantially greater. 7 2 Similarly, the
substantiality of the linkages between tax haven status and the
construction industry will depend on the amount of local materials and personnel used. If, as appears to be the case in many tax
havens, a good portion of the materials and labor are imported,
the effect on the local economy is likely to be insubstantial. If,
however, construction techniques are adapted to make maximum
use of materials and labor locally available, tax haven status
could establish and promote a local construction industry. The
training of clerical and technical personnel for work in the tax
haven sector and the development of a local financial and professional expertise among indigenous personnel who become more
deeply involved in tax haven activities could expand the portion
of tax haven services performed in the havens themselves. At present, a large portion of all services related to tax haven activities
are performed outside the havens.1'7 By developing capacity to
perform such services, the haven countries have a good chance of
attracting a greater proportion of them. On the other hand, at
least in the small, resource poor tax havens, it seems improbable
that either the training of clerical and technical personnel or the
172.
173.

Financial Times, July 22, 1980, at 30.
See Birger, supra note 152, at 21.

500

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 15.449

development of a local financial and professional expertise could
serve as a base for establishing a services sector similar to, but
not heavily dependent on, the tax haven sector. The opportunities
to do this undoubtedly are very limited, as there usually is not a
great demand for such services in the poorer tax havens. Further,
the probability of creating a demand for such services outside the
tax haven sector does not seem very likely as clerical, technical,
financial, and professional services generally are performed incident to more substantial economic activities. Of course, if the
training received by the indigenous labor force participating in
the tax haven sector were broadened to prepare the people for
other work, such as self-employment in cottage industries, the
training programs could be used to establish and develop other
sectors of the economy. In addition, if the training and employment in the tax haven sector anticipated a substantial turnover in
the indigenous work force, a fair number of people could be channelled into the training programs, through employment in the tax
haven sector, and then into employment in other sectors of the
economy.
Hence, it appears that tax haven status can be used to stimulate development in other sectors of the economy. Because of the

volatility of tax haven activities, their enclavistic nature and their
lack of substance, however, linkages with other. sectors of the
economy are unlikely to develop naturally. They probably will
arise in most cases only as a result of conscious government policies directed at establishing such linkages. Further, it seems self
evident that the level of benefit received from tax haven status
and the likelihood that haven status will act as a catalyst for development diminishes with each new country entering the tax haven business. As a consequence, as the competition for tax haven
business grows, it probably will become more and more difficult
for the established havens to sustain the level of benefits and
linkages gained from tax haven status. It also probably will become even more difficult for new entrants to establish a level of
benefits and linkages making tax haven status worthwhile.

V. RESPONSE OF NON-HAVEN COUNTRIES TO TAx HAVEN
TRANSACTIONS
Non-haven countries have responded to the growing use of tax
havens in a number of ways. They have taken unilateral action in
the form of special anti-tax haven legislation, adopted administrative and legislative rules aimed at curbing transfers to tax
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havens, and judicially attacked tax haven transactions as shams.
The non-haven countries have concluded bilateral treaties under
which they agree to cooperate in exchanging tax information in
order to reduce international tax evasion and avoidance. Several
of the bilateral tax treaties also have specific provisions aimed at
reducing the opportunities for treaty shopping. On occasion, the
bilateral treaties have led to the development of joint audit programs. At the multilateral level, little in the way of concrete action affecting tax havens has been taken. Several multilateral
studies, however, have considered the problems raised by international tax evasion and avoidance as well as the options available
for bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation to deal with
the problems.
A.

Unilateral Responses

1. Anti-Tax Haven Legislation
Legislation dealing with the use of tax havens to avoid or evade
taxes is becoming increasingly common in the industrialized
countries. 174 The United States, Canada, West Germany, France,
and Japan all have specific legislation aimed at tax avoidance
techniques which use tax havens. Given the longstanding practices of using tax havens, it is surprising that all the legislation
has been enacted within the last twenty years.17 5 The anti-tax haven legislation seeks to prevent local taxpayers from sheltering
income in tax havens through formalistic structures lacking economic substance. At the same time, no country wants to restrict

unduly legitimate international trade and investment activities.
Therefore, the legislation generally tries to draw a line between
tax haven operations and legitimate international business activi174. See, e.g., IFA Seminar Paper, supra note 119; France: Finance Law
1980, 20 EUR. TAx, 113 (Apr. 1980); Brockman, Japan: Taxation of Undistributed Profits of Designated Tax Haven Subsidiaries,79-3 TAx MGMT. INT'L J. 3
(1979); Council of Europe, Joining the struggle against InternationalTax Evasion, Apr.-May 1978 EUR. TAx'N 156; German Federal Republic: The Foreign
Base Company in the West German Tax Law, Nov. 17 & 18 EUR. TAx'N (Nov. Dec. 1977; Jan. 1978).
175. Subpart F of the United States Internal Revenue Code, enacted in 1962,
was apparently the first legislation to deal specifically with the use of foreign
entities as a means of tax deferral or avoidance. It was not until 1972 that Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany enacted similar legislation. France
enacted anti-tax haven legislation in 1973 and Japan followed suit in 1978.

502

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL. 15:449

ties. All the legislation operates in substantially the same way.
Domestic shareholders of certain controlled foreign corporations
are currently taxed on some or all of the income of the controlled
foreign corporations whether the income is distributed to the
shareholders or not. These substantial similarities as well as some
of the differences in the various approaches can be illustrated by
comparing the United States and French legislation.
a. United States
The United States has four separate tax laws dealing with the
use of tax havens. Three of the laws deal with foreign personal
holding companies,170 foreign investment companies, 1 " and foreign situs trusts, 17 8 and have only limited application to publicly
held corporations. The major United States restriction on tax hain Subpart
ven transactions and public corporations is contained
1 79
F of the United States Internal Revenue Code.
While in theory the provisions of Subpart F apply without regard to whether tax havens are involved, the legislation clearly is
designed "to impose current tax on income diverted to or lodged
in a 'tax haven' while leaving subsidiary operating profits untaxed."1 80 In general terms, Subpart F provides that any United
States person who owns, directly or indirectly, at least ten percent of a controlled foreign corporation must include in gross income his pro rata share of the foreign corporation's Subpart F

income. Therefore, as an initial requirement for the applicability
of Subpart F, the United States person must own, or be deemed
to own, ten percent or more of the total combined voting power of
all classes of voting stock of the corporation. 81 Second, the statute requires that the corporation be a "controlled foreign corporation," which is defined as a foreign corporation in which greater
than fifty percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of voting stock is owned, or deemed to be owned, by one
or more shareholders who satisfy the ten percent ownership re176.
177.
178.
179.

I.R.C. §§ 551-558 (1981).
Id. § 1246.
Id. § 679.
Id. §§ 951-64.
180. D. TILLINGHAST, TAX ASPECTS
(1978).
181. I.R.C. § 951(b).

OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
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quirement set forth above."8 2 When deciding whether there is fifty
percent ownership, the Internal Revenue Service will consider the
particular facts and circumstances of each case and will disregard
nominal ownership of the voting power if necessary to determine

actual control of the voting power.18 8 In any event, this requirement will be satisfied if the United States shareholders have the
18 4
power to control the management of the foreign corporation.
The final requirement is that the income earned by the controlled
foreign corporation be Subpart F income. In contrast to the
French legislation, which focuses on the situs of the foreign corporation, Subpart F defines taxability by reference to the nature
of the income received. As it relates to the use of tax havens, Subpart F income includes income derived from the insurance of
United States risks 85 and foreign based company income,18
which can be characterized generally as income attributable to
formalistic rather than economically substantial activities. Hence,
foreign source income derived by a controlled foreign corporation,
from the purchase and resale of property would be characterized
as Subpart F income if the purchase or resale was to a related
party and the property was not manufactured, produced, consumed, or used in the country where the controlled foreign corporation resides. 1817 Similarly, in order for foreign source services income to be characterized as Subpart F income, it must be derived
in connection with the performance of services for or on behalf of
a related person who is outside the country in which the controlled foreign corporation resides.'"
Clearly, the restrictive definitions of Subpart F income are intended to allow the use of foreign corporations for legitimate reasons without running afoul of Subpart F. There are, in addition,
two other provisions serving the same purpose. The first establishes a de minimis exception to Subpart F by providing that if
less than ten percent of the gross income of a controlled foreign

corporation is foreign based company income, no part of the income in that year is to be treated as foreign based company in182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. § 957.
Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1 (1963).
Id.
I.R.C. § 952.
Id.
I.R.C. § 954(d)(1).
I.R.C. § 954(e).
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come. " 9 The second provision prevents undue harshness by allowing the Treasury Department to exclude certain income from
Subpart F where it appears reduction of taxes was not a significant reason for either creating the foreign corporation or effecting
the particular transaction producing the income in question. 190
b. France
Although France enacted some anti-tax haven legislation in the
early 1970s, it was not until 1980 that substantial legislative efforts were made to curtail the use of tax havens by French corporations.19 1 Under the 1980 legislation, a French taxpayer liable for
the corporation's tax is subject to tax on the pro rata share of the
profits of a foreign "socitY" if the French taxpayer owns, directly
or indirectly, at least twenty-five percent of the shares of the soci~t6 and soci~t6 is established in a jurisdiction providing privileged tax status for the societ6. 192 In contrast to the anti-tax ha-

ven systems in the United States, the French legislation does not
require that the French taxpayer control the foreign societ6. Instead, a one-quarter French interest in the soci~t6 is sufficient to
establish liability for tax on a pro rata share of the profits, regardless of who holds the other shares.
Unlike the United States law, the French anti-tax haven provisions determine taxability on the basis of the situs of the foreign
soci~t6 rather than on the nature of its income. If the French tax
authorities conclude that a jurisdiction either imposes no taxes or
taxes at a rate substantially lower than the French tax rate, the
no or low tax jurisdiction is deemed to confer a privileged tax
status on entities located in the jurisdiction, and French shareholders of such entities are potentially subject to tax on their pro
rata share of undistributed profits of the entities. It is presumed
that a privileged tax status exists if the overall tax rate is less
13
than two-thirds of the applicable French tax rate.

Because the French legislation is directed to redress the misuse
of foreign tax systems, the legislation does not apply if the French
taxpayer establishes that the operations of the foreign soci~t6 do
not have as their principal purpose the location of profits in a
189.
190.
191.
192.

I.R.C. § 954(b)(3).
I.R.C. § 954(b)(4).
IFA Seminar Paper, supra note 119, at 35-36.
Id; see also France:Finance Law 1980, supra note 174.

193. IFA Seminar Paper, supra note 119, at 41-42.
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jurisdiction offering privileged tax status. 19 ' This is done by showing that the foreign entity carries on effective industrial or commercial activity and that either the foreign entity carries out most
of its operations in the local market or there exist "no ties of dependence" between the foreign entity and the other parties to the
transaction. 195
2.

Procedures Designed to Curb Transfer Pricing

Most industrialized countries and many non-haven developing

countries have rules designed to curb the shifting of profits
through artificially high or low transfer prices. These provisions
are not limited in scope to tax haven transactions but generally
apply to all transactions between related parties.""
Almost all the transfer pricing rules rely on the "arm's length
standard" which focuses on what unrelated parties would do in
similar circumstances.1 97 In other words, the arm's length approach involves an attempt to establish the price that would prevail in the marketplace. 9' 8 In large part because of the difficulties
of establishing anything other than an arbitrary arm's length
price in many cases, alternatives to the arm's length approach
have been used in recent years. For example, in some cases countries attack transfer pricing abuses by using the apportionment
method. The objective of the apportionment method is not to establish an arm's length price, but instead to determine a fair or
proper division of the global profits of an enterprise without regard for how the marketplace would operate.1 " In other cases,
countries use posted or national export prices to establish taxable
profits with respect to exports of primary commodities. With
posted or national export prices, the objective is to establish an

194. Id. at 43 (quoting article 70 of the Law of January 18, 1980).
195. Id. Dependence is considered to exist between two concerns whenever.
-either one holds, directly or through an interposed person, the
majority of the corporate capital of the other or in fact exercises
in the latter the power of decision;
-or both are likewise controlled by a third concern.
IFA SEMINAR PAPER, supra note 119, at 44.
196. See generally OECD COMM. ON FIsCAL AFFAiRS, TRANSFER PacING AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISEs,

supra note 99.

197. See United States Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(6).

198. Surrey, Reflections on the Allocation of Income and Expenses Among
National Tax Jurisdictions,10 LAw & POLICY ININT'L Bus. 409, 413-14 (1978).
199.

C. IRIsH, supra note 100, at 17.

506

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 15.449

arbitrary price at which primary commodities are deemed to leave
the country. Normally, the price is determined by reference to the
market price00 for the finished product incorporating the primary
2
commodity.
3. Restrictions on Transfer Abroad
Many countries impose restrictions on the transfer of assets
abroad. Although these restrictions often are general in scope,
they do inhibit transfers to tax havens. For example, exchange
controls, widespread in non-haven developing countries and some
industrialized countries, limit the outflow of capital to tax havens
and elsewhere. Some countries have specialized legislation aimed
at preventing the transfer of property abroad for tax avoidance
purposes. The United States, for example, imposes a thirty-five
percent excise tax on property transferred to foreign corporations,
trusts and partnerships unless it is established that the transfer is
not part of "a plan having as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of Federal income taxes. '20 1 Corporate organizations
and reorganizations involving transfers to foreign corporations
also are denied tax favored treatment unless the avoidance of
taxes is not one of the principal objectives of the transfers.2 2
4. Characterization of Tax Haven Transactions as Shams
In addition to specific anti-tax haven legislation, transfer pricing procedures and restrictions on transfers of property abroad,
non-haven countries sometimes simply characterize tax haven
transactions as shams and recast the transactions on the basis of
their substance rather than their form. For example, Ingemar
Johannsson, Swedish world heavyweight boxing champion, tried
to take advantage of an exemption in the United States/Switzerland tax treaty by claiming that he was a resident of Switzerland
and boxing in the United States as an employee of a Swiss corporation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
said that the transaction lacked substance and was a sham, so
Johannsson was taxed
in the United States as if the Swiss corpo208
ration did not exist.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 18.
I.R.C. § 1492(2).
I.R.C. § 367(a); see also I.R.C. § 679.
Johannsson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964).
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The Netherlands has no specific anti-tax haven legislation such
as that in effect in the United States, Japan, Germany, Canada,
and France, but transfers of property by Dutch persons to foreign
corporations which accumulate portfolio income are regarded as
shams. As a consequence, the foreign corporation is treated as a
Dutch corporation or as a collection of Dutch individuals °
B. BilateralResponses
The non-haven countries have concluded bilateral tax treaties
under which they agree to exchange tax information to curb international tax evasion and avoidance. The exchange of information
provisions are broad in scope and cover tax haven transactions as
well as other international evasion and avoidance activities.205
Typically, an exchange of information clause authorizes the tax-

ing authority to request and exchange information relevant to the
enforcement of the tax laws. Information such as data on dividends, interests, rents, and royalties generally is exchanged on a
routine basis and in some cases in response to specific requests.: °
Bilateral tax treaties occasionally have led to the development
of cooperative audit programs intended to reduce international
tax evasion and avoidance. The United States, for example, has
established simultaneous auditing programs with Canada, the
United Kingdom, France, and West Germany. Similar auditing
programs are in effect within the European Economic Community. Under these auditing programs, the treaty partners can
agree to audit simultaneously a multinational taxpayer. The simultaneous auditing programs are relatively new, but it is
thought that they are more thorough, more effective, and possibly
less burdensome than uncoordinated audits by various taxing authorities. 20 7 Bilateral tax treaties also are used to prevent "treaty
shopping" by making the tax preferences in the treaties unavailable to residents of third countries. The most common way of
curbing treaty shopping in tax treaties is through the inclusion of
an anti-holding company provision disallowing reduced tax rates
on dividends, interest and royalties (1) if the recipient corpora204.

IFA Seminar Paper, supra note 119.

205.

U.N GROUP OF EXPERTS ON TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DE-

VELOPING COUNTRmIES, SIXTH REPORT (ST/ESA/42) (1976).
206. Comment, Taxation: Implementation of Simultaneous Auditing Procedures, 21 Harv. Int'l L.J. 798, 799 (1980).
207. Id. at 801-02.
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tion is a resident of the other country and is at least twenty-five
percent owned, directly or indirectly, by individual residents of a
country other than where the corporation is resident, and (2) if
special tax measures apply in the country of the recipient corporation's residence and they reduce taxes on dividends, interest,
and royalty income substantially below normal corporate tax
rates in that country.208 Anti-holding company provisions are
found in the 1977 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Model Tax Convention and tax treaties the
United States has with Finland, Iceland, Korea, Luxembourg,
Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom.20 In a
similar fashion, the United Kingdom has curbed the use of international business corporations organized in Barbados through an
amendment to the United KindgomfBarbados tax treaty.210
C. MultilateralResponses
The only multilateral convention dealing with international tax
evasion and avoidance is the Convention on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters concluded by Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden in 1972. The United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and West Germany presently are considering
development of a multilateral auditing program, but such a program is not yet in existence.2 11 Various fora within the European
Economic Community, the OECD, and the United Nations have
considered the problem of international tax evasion and avoidance practices. The multilateral work done to date, however, has
12
focused on defining international tax evasion and avoidance
and on the development of standardized transfer pricing and exchange of information procedures which are to be implemented at
the national or bilateral level.215
208. Article 4, 1977 OECD Model Tax Convention; United States Model Tax
Convention.
209. Gordon, supra note 120, at 149.
210. Article 23 of the 1970 United Kingdom/Barbados tax treaty.
211. See comment, supra note 206, at 802 n.27.
212. OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AYFAIs, supra note 105; ROTTERDAM INsTITUTE
FOR FIscAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL TAX AvomANCH - VOLUME A, GENERAL AND
CONCEPTUAL MATERIAL (1979).
213. OECD Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, supra note 99; U.N. GROUP OF ExPERTs
ON TAX TREATIES, 7th Rep., supra note 101.
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D. Effectiveness of Responses to Tax Haven Transactions
The various unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral responses of
non-haven countries to the problems posed by tax haven transactions undoubtedly have limited the growth of tax haven activities.
That haven activities continue to grow, however, is a reflection
not only of the increased pressures leading people to engage in
international tax evasion and avoidance practices, but also of the
ineffectiveness of the measures taken to curb such practices.
It is clear that one of the main stumbling blocks to more effective control of international evasion and avoidance activities is
the presence of rigorous bank secrecy and corporate confidentiality laws in the tax havens. As a result of these laws, individuals
and companies are able to frame their transactions so that the
structure of the transactions, the substance of the transactions,
and the identity of the parties to the transactions cannot be discovered by authorities in non-haven countries. The measures
taken to curb tax haven activities also are not without their shortcomings. Often information collected in one department of government is not made available to other departments where it
could be productively used to curb tax haven abuses. 214The transfer pricing procedures based on the arm's length approach have
been less than satisfactory and often have been so difficult to apply that the parties have reached a negotiated settlement at an
arbitrary price. The exchange of information provisions in bilateral tax treaties are still underused and the anti-holding company
provisions are difficult to apply due to a lack of information.
As a consequence, there is considerable room for improving the
effectiveness of existing measures designed to curb tax haven
abuses. A large proportion of the improvements can be done
within the non-haven countries without the concurrence of the
tax havens. But the most effective measure, lifting the shroud of
secrecy surrounding tax haven activities, can be accomplished
only with the assistance of the tax havens themselves.
VI.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Tax haven status would appear to produce some positive benefits for the haven countries and, through careful planning, linkages can be established between the haven sector and other parts
of the economy. For the tax haven countries, the major problems
214. See Oversight Subcomm. HearingsI, supra note 1, at 184-91.
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arising from their haven status are the loss of flexibility to deal
with political, economic, and social issues, and the inherent instability of the tax haven sector. In addition, as competition for tax
haven business grows, the level of benefits for the haven countries
and the linkages to other parts of their economies are likely to be
affected adversely. Countries now entering the tax haven business
will probably also find it more and more difficult to benefit from
their status and to create linkages with other sectors of their
economies. Although the major function of tax havens is to deprive other governments of revenues they would otherwise receive, there is considerable room for accommodating the interests
of both the tax havens and the non-haven countries. Many of the
tax havens need the revenues and other benefits they derive from
their haven status, but these revenues and benefits are but a
small portion of the revenues the non-haven countries would collect if international tax evasion and avoidance were more effectively curbed. It would appear, therefore, that the tax havens
should consider establishing a dialogue with the non-haven countries to discuss the possibility of exchanging their dependence on
tax haven activities for economic assistance in other areas. Of
course, given the volatility of tax haven transactions, initiating
the dialogue would be a major problem. On the other hand, it
should be recognized that many of the more lucrative tax haven
transactions, such as offshore banking, captive insurance companies, and international finance subsidiaries, continue to benefit

the haven countries in large part because the non-haven countries
acquiesce in such activities. Hence, the tax haven countries
should consider bargaining with the non-haven countries for assistance in diversifying their economies before the non-haven
countries take unilateral action that adversely affects the bargaining power of the tax havens.

